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A WARRANT REQUIREMENT 
RESURGENCE? 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE 
ROBERTS COURT 
BENJAMIN J. PRIESTER† 
INTRODUCTION 
Over many years, the United States Supreme Court has 
developed an extensive body of precedent interpreting and 
enforcing the provisions of the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, which prohibits unreasonable searches and 
seizures by law enforcement agents conducting criminal 
investigations.  Commonly called the “warrant requirement,” one 
key component of this case law operates to deem some police 
investigatory techniques to be unconstitutional unless they are 
conducted pursuant to a search warrant issued in advance by a 
judge.  The terms of the doctrine and its exceptions also 
authorize other investigatory actions as constitutionally 
permissible without a search warrant.  The doctrinal framework 
created by the warrant requirement serves as a core foundational 
principle of the Court’s constitutional criminal procedure for 
police investigations. 
The conventional wisdom about the warrant requirement 
suggests that over the last half-century, the Court has moved 
from rigorously interpreting and enforcing the doctrine to 
reducing its importance and recognizing more exceptions for 
permissible warrantless searches.  While this perspective has 
some descriptive accuracy in the aggregate, the past decade of 
the Roberts Court has produced a series of Fourth Amendment 
decisions, ranging across a variety of subsidiary doctrinal areas, 
where the warrant requirement has made a comeback—cases in 
which a criminal defendant has prevailed because the police 
lacked a search warrant when acquiring crucial evidence during 
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the investigation.  A common thread among these decisions is the 
Roberts Court’s confrontation of the Fourth Amendment 
implications of electronic surveillance, internet connectivity, data 
analytics, and other rapidly advancing technologies in the digital 
age.  This resurgence of the warrant requirement cannot be 
readily dismissed as happenstance or coincidence, and 
consequently its development and its future ramifications are 
worthy of careful consideration. 
A. Doctrinal Foundations 
For many years, the warrant requirement has been the 
subject of considerable commentary and analysis, both in the 
opinions of the Court and among scholars.1  Reviewing the basic 
premises of the doctrine is helpful in establishing the framework 
for assessing the Court’s recent cases. 
Ratified in 1791, the Fourth Amendment accomplished two 
important objectives in repudiating certain practices by the 
Crown’s agents which, along with many others, had helped to 
provoke the American Revolution.2  First, it prohibited 
“unreasonable” searches and seizures, ensuring a significant 
degree of protection for the security of individuals and their 
property against government intrusion.3  Second, it abolished the 
general warrants and writs of assistance despised by the 
Founders, instead restricting the issuance of warrants to those 
supported by an evidentiary basis in probable cause and 
circumscribed by particularity in location, target, and subject 
matter.4  The relationship between these two clauses of the 
 
1 See David Gray, Fourth Amendment Remedies as Rights: The Warrant 
Requirement, 96 B.U. L. REV. 425, 425–36 (2016) (citing and discussing prominent 
arguments for and against warrant requirement). See generally Akhil Reed Amar, 
Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994); Phyllis T. 
Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the Fourth 
Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473 (1991); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About 
First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820 (1994). For a thorough summary of the 
current state of the doctrine and its exceptions, see The Warrant Requirement, 46 
GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 25 (2017). 
2 See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2239–40 (2018) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 402 (2014). 
3 See, e.g., Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2239–41 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 
2243–44 (arguing that, at the time of the Founding, the use of the word 
“unreasonable” in the Fourth Amendment “likely meant” to proscribe searches 
“against the reason of the common law”); Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482–84. 
4 See, e.g., Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2239–40 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Riley, 573 
U.S. at 381–83. 
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Fourth Amendment serves as a core underlying issue in debates 
over the Court’s warrant requirement doctrine.5 
The warrant requirement became prominent during the 
1960s and 1970s, when the Court’s decisions rapidly expanded 
the doctrinal scope of constitutional criminal procedure.6  In 
numerous opinions, the Court has stated the requirement in 
these terms: a warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment.7  Although the Court in 
the same period recognized a variety of situations in which that 
presumption could be overcome—such as the presence of exigent 
circumstances, the discovery of evidence of a crime in plain view, 
or a temporary “stop and frisk” detention short of custodial 
arrest8—this doctrinal formulation established an important 
procedural distinction for litigating motions to suppress evidence.  
When the police discover evidence pursuant to a search warrant, 
the burden is on the defendant to prove that the warrant was 
constitutionally defective in its issuance or that the police 
impermissibly exceeded the scope of search authorization 
contained in an otherwise duly issued warrant.9  Neither is easy 
to do, but the former is especially difficult.10  On the other hand, 
when the police discover evidence without a warrant, the burden 
falls on the government to establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that an exception to the warrant requirement applies to 
 
5 See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, ET AL., 1 UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE § 10.01 (7th ed. 2017); Gray, supra note 1. See also Groh v. Ramirez, 
540 U.S. 551, 571–73 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
6 See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 204–05 (1993); see infra Part I.B. The expansion reached 
well beyond the Fourth Amendment and the warrant requirement. See, e.g., 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471–72 (1966) (requiring advice of rights and 
valid waiver of rights prior to custodial police interrogation); Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (requiring representation by counsel at trial for felony 
defendants). 
7 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001). 
8 See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) (plain view); Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 30 (1968) (stop and frisk); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 
298–99 (1967) (exigent circumstances and plain view).  
9 See, e.g., Groh, 540 U.S. at 561; Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987); 
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 156 (1978). 
10 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984) (describing four limited 
grounds on which defendant may later challenge search warrant); see also Franks, 
438 U.S. at 156 (permitting defendant to challenge factual allegations in warrant 
affidavit only based on substantial showing of misrepresentation made intentionally, 
knowingly, or with reckless disregard for truth); DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 10.04[F] 
(discussing challenges based on scope of search authorized by warrant). 
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validate the warrantless search.11  Certainly, the label of this 
doctrine as a “requirement” for search warrants overstates its 
scope; for this reason, describing it as a “preference” for warrants 
is probably more accurate.12 
Whatever one’s position on the persuasiveness of the various 
justifications for, and critiques of, the Court’s warrant 
requirement jurisprudence, several fundamental points remain 
firmly grounded in the doctrine to this day. 
First, the warrant requirement does not apply to any and all 
activities of the police in conducting a criminal investigation, but 
only to actions which constitute a “search” as defined by the 
Court in interpreting the scope of the Fourth Amendment.  The 
Katz test provides that a “search” occurs when a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy” is breached by the police.13  Over the last 
half-century, nearly all of the Court’s decisions determining 
which investigative techniques are or are not “searches” for 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment have applied and interpreted 
this doctrine.14  In 2012, however, the Court clarified in Jones v. 
United States that a “search” also occurs when the police 
physically intrude upon a constitutionally enumerated interest 
for the purpose of obtaining information.15  Although the 
outcomes created by the Jones trespass test and the Katz 
reasonable expectation of privacy test align in situations of 
physical entry or contact,16 the Katz test is broader because it 
imposes Fourth Amendment constraints in many scenarios 
falling outside the Jones test.17  So long as the Government has 
 
11 See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 & n.14 (1974). 
12 See, e.g., Maclin, supra note 6, at 203. 
13 See generally DRESSLER, supra note 5, §§ 6.03–6.04. See also Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 354 (1967). 
14 All of the pertinent “search” cases discussed in Parts II & III, infra, address 
the application of the Katz test to the facts before the Court in one or more of the 
majority, concurring, or dissenting opinions. See infra Parts II & III. The only case 
to discuss exclusively the Jones test, without citing or applying the Katz test, is the 
per curiam opinion in Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1369–70 (2015) 
(holding that attachment of ankle bracelet for post-imprisonment satellite-based 
monitoring of sex offender constituted Fourth Amendment “search”). 
15 See generally DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 6.03[E]. See also Jones v. United 
States, 565 U.S. 400, 404, 406 n.3 (2012). 
16 See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5 (2013); id. at 13–14 (Kagan, J., 
concurring); Jones, 565 U.S. at 404–05; id. at 413 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 
431 (Alito, J., concurring). 
17 See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018) (cellphone 
location information derived from carrier business records); Kyllo v. United States, 
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performed a “search” under either test, though, Fourth 
Amendment rights—and the warrant requirement—will apply. 
Second, the purpose of the warrant requirement is to 
facilitate judicial review of police investigative activity.18  As with 
the rest of constitutional law, separation of powers principles are 
an important safeguard against governmental overreach.19  In 
1948, the Court in Johnson v. United States explained the 
applicability of judicial review to criminal procedure: 
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped 
by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the 
support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw 
from evidence.  Its protection consists in requiring that those 
inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate 
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.20 
Third, the framework created by the warrant requirement 
determines the timing of when this judicial review will occur.  
When the police obtain a search warrant, judicial review occurs 
in advance: by approving the application for a search warrant, 
the judge validates the search as “reasonable” before any 
intrusion into property or privacy takes place.21  When no 
warrant exists, judicial review necessarily occurs afterward, 
usually through a motion to suppress filed by the criminal 
defendant against whom the evidence would be used at trial.22  
The Government might prevail against that motion in one of two 
 
533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001) (thermal imager scan of home from street); Katz, 389 U.S at 
348 (electronic eavesdropping using microphone attached to exterior of phone booth). 
18 See, e.g., Maclin, supra note 6, at 237–38; Benjamin J. Priester, Five Answers 
and Three Questions After United States v. Jones (2012), the Fourth Amendment 
“GPS Case,” 65 OKLA. L. REV. 491, 512–16 (2013). 
19 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 742 (2008); Clinton v. City of 
New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450–53 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
20 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 11, 13–14 (1948). 
21 Only in a rare case would a defendant later prevail on a motion to suppress 
by arguing that the evidence seized pursuant to an executed search warrant is the 
product of a Fourth Amendment violation. See supra note 10. Claims relating to 
excessive force to persons or property by law enforcement in executing a valid 
warrant must be raised through civil litigation, see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), not 
under the exclusionary rule, see, e.g., Los Angeles County v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609, 
616 (2007) (per curiam). 
22 Challenges to warrantless searches under § 1983 are infrequent, but they do 
occur. See, e.g., Valance v. Wisel, 110 F.3d 1269, 1272 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Valance 
appeals the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the six law 
enforcement officers he sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . [claiming they had] stopped 
his vehicle without probable cause and then detained him for the purpose of 
searching the vehicle.” (footnote omitted)). 
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situations: either because the investigation properly involved a 
“reasonable” warrantless search under a doctrinally recognized 
exception to the warrant requirement or because it did not 
involve a “search” subject to the Fourth Amendment’s 
protections.23  Thus, by combining the significant benefits to the 
police from obtaining search warrants with the greater likelihood 
that evidence will be excluded from trial when they do not, the 
Court’s doctrine intends to provide strong incentives for police to 
seek judicial review in advance, rather than after the fact, when 
conducting criminal investigations. 
B. The Conventional Wisdom 
Though, of course, the reality of the Court’s opinions and the 
scholarly commentary is significantly more nuanced, the 
conventional wisdom about the warrant requirement and its 
history is fairly straightforward.  Like any generalization, it has 
important inaccuracies, as well as a considerable element of 
truth at its core. 
This conventional wisdom posits that the warrant 
requirement took hold and garnered its greatest force during the 
Warren Court and the early Burger Court in the 1960s and 
1970s, then suffered substantial undermining and retrenchment 
in the Rehnquist Court of the 1980s and 1990s, before reaching 
the contemporary Roberts Court shortly after the turn of the 
twenty-first century.24  The Court initially enforced the warrant 
requirement as the principal protection against unconstitutional 
searches, while the Court later placed more emphasis on the 
 
23 If the issue of whether a “search” of the defendant occurred is contested, the 
defendant has the burden of establishing that the Fourth Amendment’s protections 
were triggered by the pertinent police activity. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 
130 n.1 (1978) (“The proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of 
establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged 
search or seizure.”); see also Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 455 (1989) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he defendant must bear the burden of proving that . . . a ‘search’ 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment even took place.”). 
24 See, e.g., TINSLEY E. YARBOROUGH, THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 220–27 (2000); Akhil Reed Amar, The Future of Constitutional 
Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1125–27, 1131 (1996); Robert M. 
Bloom, Warrant Requirement – The Burger Court Approach, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 691 
passim (1982); Maclin, supra note 6, at 198–202; Carol S. Steiker, Counter-
Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 
MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2485–86 (1996); George C. Thomas III, Time Travel, 
Hovercrafts, and the Framers: James Madison Sees the Future and Rewrites the 
Fourth Amendment, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1451, 1457 (2005). John Roberts took 
office as Chief Justice in 2005. 
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reasonableness requirement.25  As a consequence of this 
transformation in analytical approach, the Court showed its 
willingness to assess police investigations through a balancing of 
interests after the fact rather than relying on procedural hurdles 
in advance.26  The Warren Court’s 1961 decision in Mapp v. Ohio 
made the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applicable not 
only in federal court, but also to state law enforcement 
investigations and criminal prosecutions.27  Beginning in 1984 
with United States v. Leon and accelerating in recent years, later 
Courts introduced exceptions to the exclusionary rule to enable 
them to uphold convictions even when Fourth Amendment rights 
were violated.28  Similarly, the Warren Court’s criminal 
procedure cases made extensive use of both direct appeal and 
habeas corpus to vindicate constitutional rights, while later 
Courts significantly reduced the availability of habeas corpus 
review, even before the 1996 statutory amendments.29  Fourth 
Amendment cases followed the broader pattern in criminal 
procedure as a whole, with the Warren Court’s rulings giving 
criminal defendants victory after victory while the Government 
frequently prevailed in the Rehnquist Court.30  Under this 
conventional wisdom, then, reliance on the warrant requirement 
 
25 See, e.g., Daniel J. Capra, Prisoners of Their Own Jurisprudence: Fourth and 
Fifth Amendment Cases in the Supreme Court, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1267, 1269–70, 1297 
(1991); Maclin, supra note 6, at 198–202; Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth 
Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 
383, 386, 392–93 (1988); James F. Tomkovicz, California v. Acevedo: The Walls Close 
in on the Warrant Requirement, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1103, 1104 (1992). 
26 See, e.g., Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Concept of 
Reasonableness, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 977, 1008–10 (2004); Wayne D. Holly, The 
Fourth Amendment Hangs in the Balance: Resurrecting the Warrant Requirement 
Through Strict Scrutiny, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 531, 536–40 (1997); Maclin, 
supra note 6, at 228–47. 
27 367 U.S. 643, 659–60 (1961). 
28 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984); see, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 
136–37 (2009); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 602 (2006); see also Collins v. 
Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1675–80 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining 
“serious doubts” about constitutional basis for exclusionary rule and arguing that 
Court should revisit Mapp). 
29 Compare Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 398–99 (1963), with Wainwright v. Sykes, 
433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977); see also, e.g., McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 496–97 (1991); 
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308, 310 (1989); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493–94 
(1976). Major amendments were enacted in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012)). 
30 See generally YARBOROUGH, supra note 24, at 215–42. 
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as a means of protecting Fourth Amendment rights has been on 
the decline for nearly forty years. 
In that regard, criminal procedure and the Fourth 
Amendment are little different than the broader span of 
constitutional law.  As the Court in the later twentieth century 
shifted from consistent liberal majorities to consistent 
conservative ones, it was not unexpected that later decisions 
would reshape doctrinal principles governing search and seizure 
or Miranda rights31 as much as case law relating to 
unenumerated privacy rights, affirmative action, or economic 
regulation under the Commerce Clause.32  This mirrors the early 
twentieth-century shift from conservative majorities to liberal 
ones that led to contraction or repudiation of precedent on 
similar issues of national concern.33  At the same time, these 
high-level generalities are useful only as far as they go, and 
prominent counterexamples are not hard to find in criminal 
procedure as with any other doctrinal area.  Most prominently, 
perhaps, the defendant-favorable Warren Court also decided 
Terry v. Ohio, promulgating the “stop and frisk” authority that is 
arguably the largest—and most abused—grant of discretion to 
police anywhere in Fourth Amendment case law.34 
At a general level, the conventional wisdom has some utility 
as a rule of thumb in thinking about the path of the Court’s 
decisionmaking.  While overall trends in the doctrine might not 
predict the outcome of any particular case to reach the Court, 
they provide a sense of the norms and values guiding the Court’s 
decisions.  Ultimately, the conventional wisdom reflects the 
broad consensus from participants and observers about the 
aggregate direction taken by the Court over time. 
 
31 See, e.g., Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 389 (2010); United States v. 
Patane, 542 U.S. 630. 636–37 (2004); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304 (1985); 
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 302–03 (1980). 
32 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 874 (1992). 
33 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); West Coast 
Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 517 
(1934); BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 3–7 (1998). 
34 See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan, Terry’s Original Sin, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43, 66 
(2016); David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor 
Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 659–60, 677 (1994); Carol S. Steiker, 
Terry Unbound, 82 MISS. L.J. 329, 332–33 (2013). 
2019] A WARRANT REQUIREMENT RESURGENCE? 97 
And that conventional wisdom suggests that the Roberts 
Court, building on the decisions of the Rehnquist Court that 
preceded it, would continue to limit the warrant requirement, to 
expand the reasonableness analysis, and to generally favor the 
Government rather than defendants in interpreting the scope of 
Fourth Amendment rights.  Over the past decade, however, the 
Roberts Court has departed from this expectation in several 
significant ways.  The unexpected resurgence of the warrant 
requirement in the Roberts Court deserves careful evaluation. 
I. THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT RESURGENCE 
The Fourth Amendment enumerates “persons, houses, 
papers, and effects” as the constitutionally protected interests 
secured “against unreasonable searches” carried out by the police 
or other governmental actors.35  Consequently, those interests 
long have served as the focus of the Court’s analysis in 
interpreting the warrant requirement and related doctrinal 
principles.  In the Roberts Court’s decisions, these interests 
likewise have served as the primary—but not exclusive—source 
of the resurgence in the warrant requirement. 
A. Houses and Curtilage 
The principle that homes deserve an especially strong degree 
of protection against governmental intrusion has deep roots in 
the common law.36  The aphorism that a man’s home is his castle 
reflects not only the preservation of property rights, including the 
power to exclude, but also the sanctity of the intimate details of 
private life held within.37  Even the much-ignored Third 
Amendment signifies the importance of keeping government 
agents out of private homes, except for the most justifiable of 
reasons.38  And this principle applies not only to the interior of 
 
35 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (1791). Like other areas of constitutional law, the 
Fourth Amendment only applies to state action, including informants or other 
individuals acting in cooperation with the police, but not to the actions of 
independent private parties. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115 
(1984) (private inspection followed by police search). 
36 See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6–7 (2013); Kyllo v. United States, 
533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001). 
37 See, e.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115 (2006); Minnesota v. Carter, 
525 U.S. 83, 94 (1998). 
38 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 n.5 (1967). 
98 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:89   
the home contained within its walls but also to the outdoor 
curtilage immediately adjacent to the physical structure.39 
It is fitting, then, that the Court has long insisted that a 
warrant is presumptively required to authorize constitutionally 
permissible police entry of a home.  When the police have 
probable cause to arrest a suspect, they nevertheless must obtain 
an arrest warrant before entering his home to arrest him.40  
Likewise, when the police have probable cause that evidence of 
crime is present in a residence, a search warrant—circumscribed 
by particularity as to the evidence expected to be discovered and 
seized—is required to authorize entry to obtain it.41  The Court’s 
“knock and announce” decisions further protect the interests in 
property and privacy during the execution of warrants by 
requiring the police to give the resident an opportunity to admit 
the police by their own action and to avoid forcible entry.42  Thus, 
the heightened protection for the home is secured by requiring 
judicial review in advance of entry, helping to ensure that the 
intrusion by the police is sufficiently justified and limited. 
Concomitantly, the Court has narrowly defined the 
situations in which that presumption can be overcome to justify a 
warrantless entry.  Police acting in immediate “hot pursuit” of a 
felony suspect who flees into a home are not required to abandon 
their chase and to secure the scene from the outside while 
obtaining a warrant, thereby risking the suspect getting away or 
harming innocent persons inside.43  The same principle of 
impracticability authorizes warrantless entries of homes by the 
police acting as community caretakers, such as intervening to 
avoid potential harm by an individual who poses a danger to 
himself or to others44 or to prevent the imminent destruction of 
evidence that would be gone by the time the police would be able 
to make entry with a duly obtained warrant.45  Finally, the 
 
39 See, e.g., Jardines, 569 U.S. at 6–7. 
40 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980). 
41 See, e.g., Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006); Groh v. 
Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31. 
42 See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006); Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 
U.S. 385, 387 (1997) (citing Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995)). 
43 See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42–43 (1976); Warden, Md. 
Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967). But see Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 
U.S. 740, 754 (1984) (rejecting warrantless entry of home to pursue driver involved 
in misdemeanor traffic offense). 
44 See Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 (2009) (per curiam); Stuart, 547 U.S. 
at 403–04. 
45 See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460, 460 n.3 (2011). 
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requirement of a warrant to enter and search a home is overcome 
when a resident with common authority over the premises gives 
voluntary consent to the police, but only so long as that consent 
is neither withdrawn by that resident nor vitiated by another 
resident who is present and objects.46  When an entry is based on 
exigent circumstances or consent, the Court has determined that 
judicial review after the fact is adequate to preserve the 
resident’s interests. 
On the other hand, longstanding doctrine emphasizes an 
important distinction between physical entry to the home or 
curtilage and visual observation of those spaces from a lawful 
vantage point beyond the curtilage.  An officer standing on the 
street or sidewalk, for example, might be able to see an object 
resting on a table on a front porch, to see the identifying features 
of a vehicle parked in an open garage, or to hear a loud noise 
emanating from behind a closed door or a shaded window.47  Such 
observations would not require a warrant because they do not 
constitute a “search” governed by the Fourth Amendment in the 
first instance.48  Thus, police may conduct such investigative 
activity on their own initiative, subject to judicial review 
afterward to confirm that the observations were performed in a 
permissible manner. 
This lawful vantage point doctrine became the vector by 
which the Court confronted the use of technology to conduct 
observations of the home or curtilage.  Although human beings 
are not capable of unassisted flight, the Court held in two cases 
decided in 1986 and 1989 that aerial observation of the curtilage 
from an airplane or helicopter qualified as a permissible 
warrantless observation from a lawful vantage point, including 
the use of an ordinary camera to take photographs of the 
property.49  No single line of reasoning garnered support from a 
 
46 See Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292, 298–301 (2014) (interpreting and 
applying Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 107, 111, 122–23 (2006)); United States 
v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177–78 (1974)). 
47 Compare, e.g., Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1670–71 (2018); id. at 1681 
(Alito, J., dissenting), and Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013); id. at 13–15 
(Kagan, J., concurring), with Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 43–44 (2001) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
48 See, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32. 
49 See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448–49 (1989) (observation from helicopter 
at altitude of 400 feet with the naked eye); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209, 
215 (1986) (observation from airplane at altitude of 1000 feet and photographs taken 
“with a standard 35mm camera”). 
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majority of the Court in these cases.50  The underlying analogy, 
however, is conceptually sound: areas of curtilage which might be 
obstructed from ground-level observation can be viewed by a 
variety of historically available unsophisticated methods, such as 
climbing a tree or perching atop the roof of a nearby building.  
Consequently, the police use of relatively mundane modern 
technology to obtain such views by aircraft is comparable enough 
to justify the same doctrinal result under the reasonable 
expectation of privacy analysis. 
By contrast, the Court held in 1984 that the use of a radio-
transmitter beeper to verify the presence of certain specific 
canisters of ether inside a particular residence could not be 
justified by this same reasoning.51  Rather, the use of the radio 
receiver from beyond the curtilage provided information the 
police could not otherwise have obtained from any lawful vantage 
point, and, thus, the police conducted a Fourth Amendment 
“search” by using the device to locate the canisters inside the 
home.52  In the absence of a warrant for that electronic 
surveillance of the contents of the home’s interior, the search was 
an unconstitutional intrusion into the resident’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy.53 
In 2001, the Court in Kyllo v. United States confronted a far 
more advanced device deployed to investigate a home: a thermal 
imager displaying heat differentials—the kind of infrared vision 
previously available only to fictional superheroes and some 
nonhuman animal species.54  In defending the use of the imager 
by the police without first obtaining a warrant, the Government 
noted the agents’ presence in a concededly lawful vantage point 
across the street from the home at the time they activated the 
device.55  But the Court rejected the significance of that viewing 
position and focused instead on the nature of the police 
interaction with the home.56  A breach of the resident’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy occurred because the police 
made a constructive entry into the home by using sense-
enhancing technology to obtain information about the interior of 
 
50 Ciraolo was decided 5-4 and Riley was decided 4-1-4. See also Priester, supra 
note 18, at 521. 
51 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 706 (1984). 
52 Id. at 714–16. 
53 Id. at 717–18. 
54 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29–30, 35–36, 36 n.3 (2001). 
55 Id. at 33–35; id. at 45, 48 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
56 Id. at 36–37, 40 (majority opinion). 
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the home that otherwise could only have been known by 
physically entering the home.57  Justice Scalia’s majority opinion 
emphasized that such a conclusion was necessary to ensure that 
homes retained the same degree of protection against 
governmental inspection as had been secured by the Framers in 
adopting the Fourth Amendment.58  At the same time, the 
opinion noted that if the sense-enhancing technology is in 
“general public use”—not further defined by the Kyllo  
Court—then a reasonable expectation of privacy is not breached; 
such observations would be anticipated, if not routine, in 
everyday life, whereas the use of nonpublic technology by the 
police constitutes an irregular or unusual observation of the 
home that residents cannot be deemed to have anticipated.59  
Thus, Kyllo confirmed that the police do not need a warrant to 
make observations of a home or curtilage from a lawful vantage 
point using their ordinary senses or ordinary electronic  
devices—but once technological enhancement further expands 
the information available to the police, the constitutional 
calculus changes. 
The Roberts Court has reaffirmed these core principles, 
enforcing the Fourth Amendment’s protections against both 
physical and constructive entries to the home and curtilage.  In 
doing so, the Court has protected the home and the curtilage 
against investigations that would be constitutionally permissible 
in public spaces, while laying the foundation for the important 
distinction between traditional physical inspections and 
technological surveillance that would guide its decisions beyond 
this limited context. 
In 2013, the Court in Florida v. Jardines considered the 
implications of using a canine sniff from a trained drug-detection 
dog to determine the presence of illegal narcotics inside a home.60  
Prior decisions in 1983 and 2005 had held that canine sniffs of 
airport luggage and of motor vehicles on public roadways did not 
constitute a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes and thus 
could be performed as part of a preliminary police investigation 
without the need for any individual suspicion of the subject 
 
57 Id. at 34, 40. 
58 Id. at 31, 34. 
59 See id. at 34, 40. 
60 See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 3–4 (2013). 
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property, much less a search warrant.61  The Court based this 
rule primarily on the unique binary nature of the organic 
technology: a canine sniff can only determine the presence or the 
absence of contraband.62  In Jardines, the Government relied on 
that rationale to argue that the canine sniff of a home also should 
not constitute a “search” because it likewise would not reveal any 
private or intimate details of the home, just like the luggage or 
the car, but only the presence of contraband.63  The Court 
rejected this argument, however, and held that a canine sniff of a 
home requires probable cause and a warrant.64  The majority 
opinion by Justice Scalia relied on the agent’s physical entry into 
the curtilage—the agent and the dog stood on the home’s front 
porch—for the purpose of enabling the dog to sniff from a position 
immediately adjacent to the front door, constituting a “search” 
under the terms of the Jones trespass test.65  The concurring 
opinion explained that the same result applied under the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test as elaborated in Kyllo, 
emphasizing that narcotics-detection dogs are not in “general 
public use”—and certainly not for the purpose of obtaining 
information about the interior contents of residences.66  Thus, 
although the Court’s precedent gives the police considerable 
leeway to use canine sniffs to find drugs in public spaces, the 
heightened protection applicable to homes and curtilage 
supersedes this authority. 
The 2018 decision in Collins v. Virginia reiterated this 
principle in the context of a physical search of a motorcycle.67  As 
discussed below, numerous prior cases had upheld warrantless 
searches of motor vehicles under the automobile exception to the 
warrant requirement, so long as the police had probable cause 
that evidence of crime was present.68  In Collins, the police 
located a motorcycle with probable cause to connect it to several 
prior incidents; an officer removed its tarp covering, 
photographed the motorcycle, and confirmed that its license plate 
 
61 See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005); United States v. Place, 462 
U.S. 696, 707 (1983). 
62 See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409–10; Place, 462 U.S. at 707. 
63 See Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 at 10. 
64 Id. at 10–12. 
65 See id. at 5–10. 
66 Id. at 11; see also id. at 14–15 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
67 See Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1671 (2018). 
68 See infra note 99 and accompanying text; see also Collins, 138 S. Ct.  
at 1669–70. 
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and vehicle identification number matched a stolen vehicle.69  All 
of this would have been perfectly permissible under the 
automobile exception70—but when the officer performed the 
inspection, the motorcycle was parked in an open carport at the 
top of a driveway immediately adjacent to a home where the 
defendant possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy.71  As in 
Jardines, the Court in Collins held that the officer’s physical 
intrusion into the home’s curtilage for the purpose of obtaining 
information for the police investigation constituted a “search” for 
Fourth Amendment purposes.72  Consequently, even though the 
warrantless search of the vehicle itself would have been 
independently valid, the separate and distinct search of the 
curtilage was unconstitutional because it was not conducted 
pursuant to a search warrant. 
The Court’s controversial 2011 decision in Kentucky v. King 
authorized a warrantless physical entry into a home based on the 
exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement even 
in the context of a “police-created exigency” situation.73  In that 
case, the police had probable cause that illegal narcotics were 
present inside an apartment—but also believed that the 
individuals inside were unaware of either the officers’ presence or 
the officers’ knowledge.74  Based on those facts, Justice Ginsburg 
agreed with the defendant that exigent circumstances did not 
exist: the police had plenty of time to obtain a warrant before 
entering the apartment to search for and seize the drugs.75  
Instead, however, the officers relied upon their longstanding 
“knock and talk” authority to pound on the apartment door, to 
declare their presence, and to seek cooperation from the 
residents.76  The individuals inside reacted by shouting and 
moving furniture, giving the officers additional probable cause: 
 
69 Collins, 138 S.Ct. at 1668–69; see also id. at 1671 n.2; id. at 1681 (Alito, J., 
dissenting). 
70 See id. at 1681–82 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
71 See id. at 1670–71 (majority opinion). The state did not contest Collins’ right 
to assert Fourth Amendment interests in the home because “[his] girlfriend lived in 
the house and . . . [he] stayed there a few nights per week.” Id. at 1668 & n.1. 
72 See id. at 1670–73. The officer “not only invaded Collins’ Fourth Amendment 
interest in the item searched, i.e., the motorcycle, but also invaded Collins’ Fourth 
Amendment interest in the curtilage of his home.” Id. at 1671. 
73 Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 455, 461–62 (2011). 
74 Id. at 455–57. 
75 Id. at 476–77 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
76 Id. at 456, 462 n.4, 472; see also Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 21–22 (2013) 
(Alito, J., dissenting) (describing “knock and talk” by police). 
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the belief that the destruction of the drugs was imminent to 
avoid their discovery by the police.77  The eight-justice majority 
ruled that, on these facts, the exigent circumstances exception 
obviated the need for a warrant prior to entry of the apartment to 
secure the evidence before its disappearance.78  In essence, the 
Court determined that, although the police had created the 
opportunity for the exigency to arise, the existence of the exigency 
was entirely under the control of the individuals inside the 
apartment: had they simply remained calm in reaction to the 
provocative incitement of the “knock and talk,” the officers would 
have been unable to assert a belief that any imminent 
destruction of evidence was probable.79  Viewed another way, 
although action by the police was a but-for cause of the exigency, 
its proximate cause was the reaction of the individuals inside.80  
Just as the police may hope to rely on a resident’s ignorance of 
his rights to obtain consent to search the premises,81 so too the 
police may choose to take the calculated risk that revealing their 
presence may or may not induce a reaction that justifies 
immediate warrantless entry.  Thus, although Kentucky v. King 
provides significant authority for warrantless entries to homes at 
the inducement of the police, the Court believed that its holding 
leaves control of the heightened Fourth Amendment protection 
for the home in the hands of the residents. 
B. Persons 
One might expect to see a long line of cases from the Court 
affirming that freedom from physical inspection or bodily 
intrusion of the person deserves equally strong protection as 
physical entry into the home or its curtilage and therefore 
enforcing the warrant requirement with significant rigor as to 
person as well as houses.  Little such precedent exists,  
however—likely because the Government has rarely pressed a 
 
77 King, 563 U.S. at 456, 471–72. 
78 See id. at 469–72. 
79 See id. at 457–58. 
80 “Occupants who choose not to stand on their constitutional rights but instead 
elect to attempt to destroy evidence have only themselves to blame for the 
warrantless exigent-circumstances search that may ensue.” Id. at 470. 
81 See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 199–201 (2002) (consent to search 
of person and luggage on passenger bus); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 35 (1996) 
(consent to search of automobile). 
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contrary argument in a criminal case in a manner that could 
reach the Court on discretionary review.82 
Instead, the Court’s cases establish a variety of scenarios in 
which the police are uncontestably performing a “search” of the 
person, but where that search is constitutionally reasonable 
without a warrant.  When an individual has been lawfully 
arrested with probable cause, the arresting officer may inspect 
the person, his clothing, and any containers or objects found on 
him.83  This immediate, warrantless search is justified by the 
twin interests of protecting the officer from possible ambush by 
concealed weapons or dangerous items and securing any 
destructible evidence in the arrestee’s possession—and by the 
principle of impracticability, because those interests would be 
thwarted by the delay attendant to obtaining a search warrant.84  
Similarly, the exterior pat down of clothing carried out as part of 
a Terry stop-and-frisk protects the officer from potential attack 
by an armed and dangerous individual during a temporary 
investigative detention that is even shorter in duration and less 
secure than a custodial arrest, making warrants even more 
impracticable in that context.85  Even in the more controlled 
setting of the police station, certain warrantless searches of the 
person are reasonable.  If the arrestee is to be held in custody in 
jail, a full-body strip search of the person is permissible before 
introduction into the inmate population.86  A cotton swab may be 
 
82 For example, in Grady v. North Carolina, the Court addressed the use of an 
ankle bracelet GPS tracking device to monitor the location of a recidivist sex 
offender after release from incarceration, but only for the limited purpose of 
confirming that such a post-conviction program constitutes a “search” subject to 
Fourth Amendment analysis even when it is civil in nature. See 135 S. Ct. 1368, 
1370–71 (2015) (per curiam). The Court has ruled that certain searches of the person 
violate the Fourth Amendment in § 1983 cases as well. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. 
Dist. v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 368, 378–79 (2009) (holding that, notwithstanding 
school officials’ extensive authority and discretion, a strip search of a middle school 
student suspected of possessing and distributing ibuprofen in violation of school 
rules was an unreasonable violation of the Fourth Amendment); Ferguson v. City of 
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 79–86 (2001) (holding that involuntary drug testing of 
pregnant mothers in a public hospital did not qualify as a “special needs” search and 
thus was an unreasonable violation of the Fourth Amendment without a warrant 
and probable cause). 
83 See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). 
84 See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338–39 (2009). 
85 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 23–31 (1968); see also, e.g., Minnesota v. 
Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 378 (1993) (applying limited scope of permissible Terry 
frisk). 
86 See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 566 U.S. 318, 334, 
338–39 (2012). 
106 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:89   
inserted into the mouth to obtain a saliva sample for DNA 
identification purposes,87 and a DUI arrestee may be compelled to 
exhale air into a breathalyzer device to confirm blood-alcohol 
content (“BAC”).88  In each of these situations, the Court is 
satisfied with judicial review of the bodily search after the fact in 
a motion to suppress. 
Yet, the Roberts Court has found occasion to reinvigorate the 
warrant requirement for searches of the person in light of recent 
technological advancements.  In 1966, the Court held in 
Schmerber v. California that a police officer could obtain a 
warrantless blood draw by a medical professional to establish 
BAC in a drunk driving investigation, reasoning that the 
reliability of the BAC calculation would be compromised by the 
delay caused by waiting for a search warrant, thereby creating 
exigent circumstances to secure the evidence immediately before 
its degradation.89  Relying on this decision, some states 
statutorily authorized police to obtain compelled blood draws 
from DUI arrestees.90  In a pair of decisions in 2013 and 2016, the 
Court ruled these statutes unconstitutional as applied to most 
DUI arrests and sharply narrowed the exigency rationale for DUI 
blood draws.91  The Court repudiated neither the scientific 
rationale—it remains true today that the body’s natural 
metabolism degrades BAC over time—nor the inherent presence 
of probable cause to justify confirming BAC that comes with any 
lawful drunk driving arrest.92  Instead, the Court emphasized 
that the processing time in obtaining warrants has decreased 
substantially over the half-century since Schmerber, mooting the 
exigency concerns under most circumstances.93 
In particular, the Court reasoned in both Missouri v. 
McNeely and Birchfield v. North Dakota that today’s readily 
available technology means that it is no longer necessary for 
either an officer to physically visit the courthouse to file tangible 
paperwork or a judge to be physically present in the courthouse 
building to review it for a search warrant to be issued.94  Rules of 
 
87 See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 465–66 (2013). 
88 See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2176–78, 2184–85 (2016). 
89 384 U.S. 757, 770–72 (1966). 
90 See Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 160–61 (2013). 
91 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2185–86; McNeely, 569 U.S. at 160–63, 165. 
92 See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2174; McNeely, 569 U.S. at 151–52. 
93 See McNeely, 569 U.S. at 154–55. 
94 See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2192–93 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); McNeely, 569 U.S. at 154–55. 
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procedure have been amended to allow police officers to submit 
warrant applications electronically from the field, such as from 
Wi-Fi-enabled laptops in patrol cars, and for judges to approve 
them electronically in a matter of minutes, including from a 
home computer—or perhaps even a smartphone.95  This ready 
availability of electronic warrants has dramatically reduced the 
delay involved in waiting to obtain judicial review in advance of 
the search; a process that might have taken hours now can occur 
in a matter of minutes, especially if an on-call judge is assigned 
to review electronic requests promptly at any hour of the day or 
night.96  Accordingly, the Court refused to allow statutory 
authority to remain premised on obsolete assessments of delay 
and exigency, holding that a warrantless DUI blood draw to 
confirm BAC is constitutionally permissible only based on a 
fact-specific showing of impracticability in obtaining an electronic 
warrant expeditiously in the context of a particular arrest.97  
Although the search of the person involved in McNeely and 
Birchfield is an especially intrusive one—a medical procedure to 
pierce the skin and withdraw blood—the Court’s reasoning about 
the speed at which warrants can now be obtained has the 
potential to resonate in the analysis of any exception to the 
warrant requirement based on principles of impracticability. 
C. Effects 
The recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement 
authorize a wide variety of warrantless searches of personal 
effects.  Searches incident to arrest encompass not only the 
warrantless seizure of physical objects found on the person, but 
also subsequent warrantless inspection to determine what has 
been found, such as laboratory testing to confirm the presence of 
illegal narcotics.98  When the police have probable cause, the 
automobile exception similarly permits both the warrantless 
seizure of a motor vehicle and the warrantless search of 
 
95 See McNeely, 569 U.S. at 154–55. 
96 See McNeely, 569 U.S. at 154–55, 164. 
97 See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2184, 2186; McNeely, 569 U.S. at 156, 164. The 
dissent in Birchfield argued that the same reasoning should require a search 
warrant for a BAC breath test as well. See 136 S. Ct. at 2195–96 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
98 See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 336 (2009) (bag of cocaine found in 
pocket of jacket in back seat of car after driver’s arrest for traffic offense); United 
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 222–23 (1973) (heroin capsules found in cigarette 
carton in shirt pocket of driver arrested for traffic offense). 
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anywhere within the vehicle where the evidence sought could be 
found, including storage spaces in the car like the trunk or glove 
compartment, as well as personal effects found inside the car, 
such as a purse or bag.99  Personal property in police custody 
arriving at the police station, such as during booking of an 
arrestee or impoundment of a car, is subject to an inventory 
search using the department’s established standardized 
protocols.100  And a person may give voluntary consent to allow 
the police to inspect his property even if the police can articulate 
no individualized suspicion for requesting cooperation from 
him.101  Thus, tangible personal property as a category receives 
less rigorous Fourth Amendment protection than homes or 
persons.102 
On the other hand, authority to search personal effects is not 
unrestricted, and the police must take care to ensure that a valid 
exception to the warrant requirement applies.  In 1977, the Court 
considered the somewhat remarkable facts of United States v. 
Chadwick.103  FBI agents had clear probable cause from a canine 
sniff that the defendants’ footlocker contained illegal narcotics; 
after the defendants loaded the footlocker into the trunk of a car 
but before they drove away, the agents arrested them and seized 
the footlocker, which was opened several hours later at the FBI 
office without a warrant.104  The Court explained why, on the 
facts, the agents could not rely upon exigent circumstances, the 
automobile exception, search incident to arrest, inventory search, 
or consent to overcome the need for a search warrant—and, 
therefore, the marijuana inside the footlocker had been found in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.105  The 2000 decision in 
Bond v. United States reaffirmed this principle.106  While lawfully 
interacting with bus passengers at a valid immigration 
checkpoint near the border with Mexico, an agent reached up to 
 
99 See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 298 (1999) (purse on back seat); see 
also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 567 (1991) (paper bag in trunk). 
100 See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990); see also Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 
U.S. 640, 648 (1983); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976). 
101 See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2002). 
102 Where the nature of an object as a dangerous weapon or criminal evidence is 
“immediately apparent,” the police may seize it on the spot without a warrant to 
secure its later use against the individual. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 
U.S. 366, 375 (1993); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136–37 (1990). 
103 433 U.S. 1, 3–5 (1977). 
104 Id. 
105 See id. at 5–6, 11, 13, 14–15. 
106 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000). 
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the overhead storage space and squeezed a soft-sided duffel bag 
belonging to the defendant.107  The Court rejected the 
Government’s position that the agent’s action was routine, 
incidental contact, which the defendant necessarily accepted 
while traveling on a passenger bus and instead ruled that the 
agent’s exploratory manipulation of the bag exceeded the 
permissible bounds of interaction between fellow travelers and 
therefore breached his reasonable expectation of privacy on the 
facts without any applicable exception to the warrant 
requirement.108 
The Jones decision in 2012 extended this principle, holding 
that a physical trespass upon the defendant’s motor vehicle for 
the purpose of obtaining information—specifically, the 
attachment of a GPS device which electronically transmitted its 
coordinates at frequent intervals to create an ongoing log of its 
location—constituted a search of the vehicle requiring a 
warrant.109  The majority opinion reached this conclusion even 
though the information ultimately sought by the Government 
involved electronic data points about the vehicle’s public 
movements over time rather than the nature of its physical 
contents, unlike the interior inspections of containers in 
Chadwick and Bond or the canine sniff of the automobile in 
Illinois v. Caballes.110  One important limitation governs the 
Fourth Amendment protection of effects: the challenged search 
must relate to the defendant’s own personal effects.  For 
example, discarded or abandoned property no longer carries any 
reasonable expectation of privacy, so a defendant could not claim 
Fourth Amendment protection against police inspection of his 
curbside trash left out for pickup.111  Similarly, the Court held 
that a temporary passenger in a car cannot assert a reasonable 
expectation of privacy against police search of the vehicle unless 
the individual can establish some ownership or possessory 
 
107 Id. at 335–36. 
108 Id. at 338–39. 
109 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012). The Government 
had obtained a warrant but failed to execute it in compliance with its terms; for the 
purposes of its decision, the Court treated the case as involving warrantless GPS 
surveillance. Id. at 402–03, 403 n.1. 
110 Id. at 408–09; see also id. at 430–31 (Alito, J., concurring) (reaching same 
conclusion under Katz test). 
111 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988). 
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interest in either the vehicle itself or the items discovered during 
the search.112 
The 2018 decision in Byrd v. United States, however, 
indicates that the Roberts Court follows a functional approach to 
this doctrine rather than a formalistic one.113  In that case, the 
defendant’s acquaintance obtained a rental car on his behalf, 
apparently because he knew that his criminal record would cause 
him to be rejected, and the defendant’s driving of the vehicle 
indisputably violated the terms of the rental contract as executed 
by the acquaintance.114  The Government claimed that the 
defendant therefore lacked any reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the vehicle and could not object to the search of the trunk that 
uncovered body armor and a considerable quantity of illegal 
narcotics, but the Court unanimously rejected that argument.115  
Instead, the Court ruled that the breach of contract alone was 
insufficient to abrogate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment 
rights, particularly because his right to possess, control, and 
exclude others from the car was nevertheless superior to anyone 
else’s.116  Although the Court remanded for a  determination of 
whether the search might be upheld on some other basis, the 
emphasis on a pragmatic rather than technical interpretation of 
the definition of “his” effects for Fourth Amendment purposes is 
doctrinally significant.117 
 
112 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978). In Rakas, the defendants 
disclaimed ownership of the items seized as evidence, which were later connected to 
them anyway. Id. at 130–31, 148. In Wyoming v. Houghton, by contrast, a car 
passenger undeniably had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her own purse, but 
the warrantless search of her purse was constitutional as part of an overall search of 
the car under the automobile exception. 526 U.S. 295, 298, 300, 307 (1999). The 
Court has recognized that guests in homes possess broader reasonable expectation of 
privacy interests. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 89 (1998); Minnesota v. 
Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98–99 (1990). 
113 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1530–31 (2018). 
114 Id. at 1524, 1529–30. 
115 Id. at 1525, 1527; see also id. at 1531 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 1531–32 
(Alito, J., concurring). 
116 Id. at 1527–29 (majority opinion). 
117 See id. at 1526–27, 1530; see also id. at 1531 (Thomas, J., concurring). The 
Court noted that, on remand, the lower courts could consider whether on these facts 
the defendant should be treated as equivalent to a wrongful possessor like a thief, as 
well as whether the police had probable cause to lawfully search the car without a 
warrant in any event under the automobile exception. See id. at 1529–31 (majority 
opinion); id. at 1532 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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D. Papers 
The protection against unreasonable searches or seizures of 
papers has the same limitation: only the person whose papers 
were seized or searched has a Fourth Amendment interest to 
assert.  Under the “third party doctrine” component of the Katz 
analysis, an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in business records created or maintained by companies with 
which they interact.118  Thus, no “search” for Fourth Amendment 
purposes occurs, and neither individualized suspicion nor a 
warrant is required, when the police obtain bank records, phone 
company dialing records, or billing records relating to a 
customer.119  Even in a case where agents acting without a 
warrant brazenly absconded with a bank vice president’s 
briefcase and successfully copied the papers inside before he 
returned from dinner none the wiser, the Court held that the 
bank customer whose records had been obtained in the raid 
nevertheless could not suppress those papers from his criminal 
trial, because only the vice president’s Fourth Amendment rights 
had been violated, not the customer’s own personal rights.120 
In some cases, of course, the defendant’s own papers will be 
at issue.  As with bodily searches of persons, the Court has few 
contemporary decisions in which the importance of the Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirement to inspections of papers by the 
police is a noteworthy aspect of a doctrinal holding.121  As with 
searches of effects, recognized exceptions to the warrant 
requirement provide a number of contexts in which the police 
would incidentally acquire, and observe the contents of, various 
writings, such as the exterior notation on an envelope discovered 
in plain view during a search of a car or a handwritten list found 
 
118 See Priester, supra note 18, at 525–26. 
119 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979) (phone company dialing 
records for individual customer); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 446 (1976) 
(bank account records for individual customer); Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 
U.S. 21, 52–54 (1974) (bank business records required pursuant to Bank Secrecy 
Act). 
120 United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 (1980). 
121 The Court has addressed governmental investigation into papers more 
frequently under the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See, e.g., 
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 29–30, 34 (2000) (grand jury subpoena for 
business records also implicating personal criminal liability of recipient); United 
States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 606–07 (1984) (grand jury subpoena for sole 
proprietorship business records); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 394, 396 
(1976) (IRS summons for taxpayer documents); see also infra note 195 (discussing 
Fourth Amendment implications for subpoenas after Carpenter). 
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in the pocket of an arrestee.122  On the other hand, when the 
police specifically set out to locate and take custody of a person’s 
documents with the objective of performing a thorough 
evidentiary search for written evidence of crime contained 
therein, the Court presumably has assumed that the police and 
the lower courts understood that a search warrant is required 
both to seize and to read and analyze such papers as part of a 
police investigation.123 
For that reason, the Court’s 2014 decision in Riley v. 
California is profoundly significant in declaring that the warrant 
requirement applies to evidentiary searches of digital data 
contained on electronic devices the police have lawfully seized.124  
The defendants in Riley had been lawfully arrested and brought 
to the police station, where the police had lawful custody of the 
smartphones removed from their persons incident to the 
arrests.125  Without obtaining search warrants, the police 
conducted inspections of the digital data on the phones—
including phone numbers, contacts lists, text messages, and 
photographs—which resulted in the discovery of evidence used to 
convict the defendants.126  The Government sought to defend the 
inspections as a valid warrantless search incident to arrest; 
although the Court agreed that inspection of physical objects 
found on the person should remain permissible, it rejected the 
applicability of that exception to the warrant requirement for 
digital data.127  Accordingly, the Court overturned the 
convictions, ruling that the evidence obtained from the 
 
122 See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 455–56 (1980) (stating that an 
officer conducting traffic stop observed “on the floor of the car an envelope marked 
‘Supergold’ that he associated with marihuana” and, after arresting the car’s 
occupants, “picked up the envelope marked ‘Supergold’ and found that it contained 
marihuana”). “It has long been accepted that written items found on the person of an 
arrestee may be examined and used at trial.” Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 405 & 
n.* (2014) (Alito, J., concurring) (citing authorities). 
123 Different principles apply when government investigators seek to inspect 
papers for administrative or regulatory purposes, rather than as part of a criminal 
investigation. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452 (2015). 
Grand jury subpoenas have also traditionally been subject to different Fourth 
Amendment analysis than investigative action by the police has been. See infra note 
195. 
124 See 573 U.S. 373, 403. 
125 See id. at 378–81. 
126 See id. 
127 See id. at 386. 
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warrantless search of the phones’ digital data should have been 
suppressed under the exclusionary rule.128 
Most importantly, the Riley Court emphasized that the 
digital data contained on electronic devices is both quantitatively 
and qualitatively different than information revealed by physical 
objects, including traditional papers.129  The vast data-storage 
capacities of today’s handheld devices—not to mention 
information stored in “the cloud” and equally accessible from an 
internet-enabled device—is orders of magnitude larger than what 
any person could have physically carried with them in a purse, 
briefcase, or even a duffel bag or rolling luggage.130  Likewise, 
much of this data is highly personal in nature—from medical 
information and religious or political affiliation to intensely 
private intimate details of a person’s life—and was never carried 
around as a matter of course in everyday life in earlier times.131  
Taken together, the information revealed by an evidentiary 
search of digital data on smartphones and similar devices simply 
is not analogous to the inspection of physical objects.132  Thus, the 
Court recognized that doctrinal principles grounded in the 
practical realities of the common law, and even the analog 
modern period, cannot be transposed by rote to digital data in the 
internet age. 
E. “Surveillance” in the Analog Age: Eavesdropping and 
Location Tracking 
From the ratification of the Constitution to today, federal 
criminal law enforcement has always been a small fraction of the 
overall criminal justice system in the United States, even during 
the heights of alcohol Prohibition in the 1920s and the “war on 
drugs” in the 1980s.133  Consequently, prior to Mapp in 1961, the 
 
128 See id. at 403. For one defendant, the Court affirmed the reversal of the 
conviction by the lower court. See id. 
129 See id. at 393–94. 
130 See id. at 393–95. 
131 See id. at 395–97. 
132 See id. at 386, 397. 
133 Compare Total Incoming Criminal Caseloads Reported by State Courts, All 
States, 2007-2016, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/ 
media/Microsites/Files/CSP/Criminal/PDFs/EWSC-2016-CRIM-Page-1-Trend.ashx 
(last visited May 16, 2019) (reporting 17.8 million incoming state criminal cases in 
2016), with Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2016, UNITED STATES COURTS, 
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2016 
(last visited May 16, 2019) (reporting 79,787 filings for criminal defendants in 
federal district courts in 2016). 
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Court had decided a comparatively small number of 
constitutional criminal procedure cases, although some 
contemporary doctrines have their roots in that period.134  After 
the incorporation of the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary 
rule to the states, though, the Court began to review 
investigations conducted not only by highly trained and 
well-funded federal agencies like the FBI, but also all manner of 
state and local law enforcement around the country, including 
some plagued by incompetence, vindictiveness, or racism in 
addition to less sophistication in best practices or legal 
obligations.135  It is not surprising, then, that this exposure to the 
reality of law enforcement in the United States led the Court to 
seek to ensure judicial review of a broader scope of police 
investigations than it historically had required. 
One vector in this transformation occurred in the Court’s 
definition of what kinds of police surveillance activity constitute 
a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes.  Until the 
mid-twentieth century, the police necessarily conducted 
investigations by using their natural senses to make observations 
of physical places and tangible evidence because little else was 
technologically possible.  When police began to make use of 
electronic eavesdropping, such as microphones and wiretaps, to 
investigate suspects, the Court initially retained its existing 
doctrine, holding that no “search” occurred unless the police 
physically entered a constitutionally protected area such as a 
home or office.136  For example, the Court held that police needed 
probable cause and a warrant to deploy a “spike mike” that 
physically penetrated into a wall of a house, but not to install a 
wiretap that intruded into a phone line at a position on the street 
where the homeowner had no property interest in the phone 
company’s hardware.137  The scope of an individual’s Fourth 
 
134 See generally, e.g., Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927) (warrantless 
search incident to arrest); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (warrantless 
searches of automobiles); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (exclusionary 
rule). 
135 See generally, e.g., Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974); Cox v. Louisiana, 
379 U.S. 536 (1965); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
136 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–53 (1967). 
137 See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 506–07, 511–12 (1961) (spike 
mike physically intruding into a “constitutionally protected area”); id. at 508–10 
(distinguishing Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), which involved a 
“detectaphone” placed flush against a wall without physically penetrating into it); 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 456–57 (1928) (wiretap into home phone 
lines on street outside). 
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Amendment rights depended on the specific type of technology 
used by the police in a particular instance, rather than on the 
kind of evidence the police hoped to acquire. 
In 1967, the Court in Katz rejected this narrow 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.138  Famously, the Court 
declared that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not 
places,” and ruled that the Fourth Amendment applied to the use 
of an eavesdropping microphone affixed to the exterior of a glass 
phone booth to perform surveillance on the occupant’s end of the 
phone conversation.139  Rather than restrict the scope of the 
Fourth Amendment to physical intrusions into houses or physical 
inspections of tangible effects or papers, the Court recognized 
that technological surveillance poses an equally great threat to 
liberty and privacy.140  After all, eavesdropping or wiretapping a 
phone call may be just as valuable to the police as reading a 
person’s written papers, or a recording of a conversation just as 
powerful evidence of guilt in court as revealing a written 
document planning or confessing the crime.  Accordingly, the 
Court adopted a doctrinal test based on the exercise of reasoned 
normative judgment about which police investigative techniques 
should be subject to advance judicial review.141 
Importantly, the Court’s doctrinal shift in Katz did not make 
the Fourth Amendment concept of a “search” coextensive with 
the existence of a police investigation for information or 
evidence.142  For example, after Katz the Court reaffirmed the 
“open fields” doctrine, which provides Fourth Amendment 
 
138 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. 
139 See id. at 351; see also id. at 359. 
140 See id. at 355–58. 
141 See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2246 (2018) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting) (“[A] normative understanding is the only way to make sense of this 
Court’s precedents . . . .”); Nicholas Kahn-Fogel, An Examination of the Coherence of 
Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 275, 283 & n.38, 
39 (2016); Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective 
Expectations, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 113, 115, 132, 134 (2015); Orin S. Kerr, Four Models 
of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 520 (2007); Matthew B. 
Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Myth of Fourth Amendment Circularity, 84 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1747, 1754 (2017); Anna Lvovsky, Fourth Amendment Moralism, 166 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1189, 1209 (2018); Matthew Tokson, Knowledge and Fourth Amendment 
Privacy, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 139, 194 (2016). 
142 But see Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2238 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that 
the term “search” was not a term of art at the time of the Founding); see also Brief of 
Scholars of the History and Original Meaning of the Fourth Amendment as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 6–14, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 
(2018) (No. 16-402) [hereinafter Historical Scholars Brief]. 
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protection for homes and curtilage but not for other real property 
owned by an individual.143  Fences and “no trespassing” signs are 
insufficient, the Court determined, to meaningfully prevent 
others—whether the public at large or the police—from crossing 
rural land to observe marijuana growing in a wooded area over a 
mile away from a home or to peer inside a barn housing an 
amphetamine lab rather than horses or cattle.144  While the 
individual landowners surely did not anticipate the police 
discovery of their crimes in that manner, the Court ruled that no 
reasonable expectation of privacy was breached by the police 
physically crossing land and visually inspecting plants or 
structures found in a location qualifying as open fields.145 
Similarly, the Court did not determine that all forms of 
technologically enhanced police investigation, simply by the fact 
of that enhancement, justified the reliance on the warrant 
requirement for oversight and accountability.  The Katz decision 
itself noted that information which a person “knowingly exposes 
to the public” lacks constitutional protection from police 
discovery.146  Katz distinguished the agents’ electronic 
eavesdropping on the contents of the defendant’s spoken words, 
which the phone booth kept obscured from being overheard by 
the naked ear, and their visual observation of his presence 
through the transparent glass, which the defendant accepted as a 
necessary consequence of making the phone call on the street 
rather than inside a building.147 
In 1983, the Court applied this rationale in United States v. 
Knotts to conclude that a person cannot claim a reasonable 
expectation of privacy against observation of his movements on 
public roads.148  Standing alone, police officers in an unmarked 
car “tailing” a motor vehicle to track its location by following its 
travels and keeping it in sight without revealing their presence 
was not constitutionally distinguishable from constables 
attempting to surreptitiously follow a person traveling on foot or 
 
143 See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 294 (1987); Oliver v. United States, 
466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924). 
144 See Dunn, 480 U.S. at 297–300; Oliver, 466 U.S. at 173–74. 
145 See Dunn, 480 U.S. at 300–04; Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179–81, 182. 
146 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
147 See id. at 352. “But what he sought to exclude when he entered the booth 
was not the intruding eye—it was the uninvited ear.” Id. 
148 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983). 
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horseback in earlier times.149  In Knotts, however, the police 
conducting visual observation using a pursuing car and overhead 
helicopter supplemented their tracking by means of a 
radio-transmitter beeper that emitted an intermittent pulse 
detectable by an attuned receiver in the helicopter.150  The 
defendant argued that this technologically enhanced surveillance 
of the car’s drive from Minneapolis, Minnesota, to a cabin in 
western Wisconsin required different treatment under Katz.151  
The Court rejected that claim and held that the use of the beeper 
to minimize the opportunity for error in tracking the defendant’s 
location on public roads did not breach a reasonable expectation 
of privacy, and thus no warrant was required.152 
Although the Court in 2012 unanimously ruled in Jones that 
the month-long warrantless GPS tracking of the defendant’s 
vehicle violated his Fourth Amendment rights, the Court’s 
reasoning in doing so reaffirmed the surveillance analysis under 
Katz in contexts more closely resembling its original analog-era 
incarnation.153  The majority opinion’s trespass test analysis has 
no applicability in situations like Knotts, where the surveillance 
involved only observation from afar.154  Likewise, the Jones 
concurring opinion’s Katz analysis specifically emphasized that 
short-term location tracking breaches no reasonable expectation 
of privacy because it is a longstanding routine police practice that 
consumes relatively few police resources.155  What distinguished 
Jones from Knotts in the Katz analysis was both the quantity of 
location tracking data gathered by the electronically enhanced 
surveillance—not simply for twenty-eight days, but twenty-four 
hours per day to accumulate over two thousand pages of location 
data points—and the qualitative nature of the technology 
involved—using automated hardware and software to generate 
surveillance data with no human involvement and at minimal 
 
149 See id. at 282–83, 285; see also Jones v. United States, 565 U.S. 400, 420 & 
n.3 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
150 See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277–79. 
151 See id. at 284. 
152 See id. at 281–82, 284–85; see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 429 n.10 (Alito, J., 
concurring) (noting limitations and fallibility of beeper technology in Knotts). 
153 See Jones, 565 U.S. at 413–14 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 431 (Alito, 
J., concurring). 
154 See id. at 408–09, 411–12 (majority opinion). 
155 See id. at 427, 429–30 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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cost.156  When combined, these factors bypassed the significant 
practical limitations which otherwise would make prohibitive the 
notion of conducting extensive police surveillance of suspects’ 
public movements in mundane cases.157  Where such factors are 
not involved, however, the traditional rule continues to apply 
after Jones, permitting warrantless location tracking of public 
movements. 
The Court’s 2018 decision in Carpenter v. United States 
reinforced this implication from Jones.158  Putting the defendant 
on trial for his involvement in six robberies over several months, 
the Government sought to establish his presence at the locations 
of the robberies at the time of the crimes.159  To the extent the 
prosecution’s case used traditional means of proving those facts, 
such as testimony from fellow conspirators, no Fourth 
Amendment issue was raised.160  But the Government also relied 
heavily on historical cell-site location information (“CSLI”) 
obtained from the archived business records of two mobile phone 
service providers.161  After acquiring over 120 days of data 
comprising nearly 13,000 data points, an investigating agent 
testified at trial using maps marked with the crime scenes and 
cellular antenna sites.  This testimony demonstrated for the jury 
how the CSLI corroborated the cooperating accomplices’ 
testimony about the defendant’s location at the pertinent times.  
In addition, in closing argument, the prosecutor highlighted the 
value of the CSLI evidence in proving the defendant’s guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.162 
As in Jones and Riley, the Court distinguished the 
information about the defendant’s location used in Carpenter by 
emphasizing that historical CSLI is both quantitatively and 
qualitatively different from previous forms of police location 
surveillance.163  Like Jones, the massive amount of data gathered 
 
156 See id. at 425–26, 428–31 (Alitor, J., concurring); see also id. at 403 
(describing amount of data generated by GPS device attached to defendant’s 
vehicle). 
157 See id. at 429–30 (Alito, J., concurring). 
158 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2215, 2216–17 (2018). 
159 See id. at 2212–13. 
160 Seven conspirators testified against Carpenter at trial. See id. at 2212. Even 
if the Government learned of the person’s identity as fruit of an unconstitutional 
search, a defendant cannot assert the exclusionary rule to bar the testimony of a 
cooperating witness. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 279–80 (1978). 
161 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212. 
162 See id. at 2212–13. 
163 See id. at 2217, 2218–19, 2220, 2223. 
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about the defendant’s public movements only existed by 
technologically bypassing resource constraints on obtaining such 
evidence by human observation.164  Like Riley, the existence of 
archived historical CSLI provided the Government with 
information that literally would have been impossible to obtain 
at common law, or even at the turn of the twenty-first century: 
tracking a person’s public movements retroactively, not at the 
time of their movements, with perfect electronic recall not subject 
to the faults of human memory normally inherent in 
reconstructing past events long after they have occurred.165  
Finding these distinctions to be crucial, the Carpenter majority 
rejected reflexive application of the third party doctrine to 
deprive the location information of Fourth Amendment 
protection simply because it originated in the companies’ 
archived business records.166  Instead, the majority viewed the 
location surveillance data in Jones and Carpenter as functionally 
identical in their impacts at the respective trials, such that the 
difference in the manner of the data’s acquisition in the two cases 
did not justify divergent doctrinal outcomes.167  Accordingly, the 
Court held that the use of historical CSLI to reconstruct the 
defendant’s public movements over a period of several months 
breached his reasonable expectation of privacy, and thus violated 
his Fourth Amendment rights because it was performed without 
a search warrant.168 
 
164 See id. at 2217, 2219–20. 
165 See id. at 2218, 2219. Public and private security cameras and surveillance 
cameras, especially when their feeds are recorded and then archived for extended 
periods of time, raise the same issue. See, e.g., Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Fourth 
Amendment Future of Public Surveillance: Remote Recording and Other Searches in 
Public Space, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 21, 26, 45 (2013); I. Bennett Capers, Crime, 
Surveillance, and Communities, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 959, 963–64 (2013); Stephen 
Rushin, The Judicial Response to Mass Police Surveillance, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. 
& POL’Y 281, 286–89 (2011). 
166 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217; see also id. at 2226 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting); id. at 2260 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 2262 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
167 See id. at 2216–19 (majority opinion). 
168 See id. at 2217, 2221, 2223. In Carpenter, the federal investigators obtained 
the historical CSLI by means of a court order issued by a magistrate judge pursuant 
to the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(d). See id. at 2212. 
The majority concluded that the SCA’s requirements were insufficient to protect 
Carpenter’s Fourth Amendment rights. See id. at 2221; see also id. at 2231, 2233 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 2254–56, 2261 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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II. HOW FAR WILL THE RESURGENCE REACH? 
In light of the Roberts Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions 
over the past decade, especially taken as a whole, it is difficult to 
dismiss the resurgence of the warrant requirement as 
happenstance or coincidence.  Jones and Jardines have 
reinvigorated the traditional protection against physical 
inspections.  Jones, Riley, and Carpenter have recognized that 
the scope of data generated by simply living everyday life in the 
United States in the internet-connected digital age—whether 
that data is created by an individual, a corporation, or a 
government investigator—requires new Fourth Amendment 
principles not only to preserve the protections that existed at 
common law but also to ensure equivalent protection in 
technological scenarios unimaginable to the Framers.  And 
McNeely and Birchfield have emphasized the pragmatic reality 
that these same technological developments mean that 
electronically issued search warrants are easier than ever for the 
police to apply for, and faster than ever for judges to approve or 
reject, once the facts giving rise to probable cause are known. 
Rather, the question is how far the Roberts Court’s 
resurgence in the warrant requirement will extend.  Is the Court 
mainly acting on the margins, cautiously exercising restraint in 
the scope of its cases and decisions, to prevent the police from 
making a rapid technological end-run around the longstanding 
constitutional and pragmatic limitations on their investigative 
power?169  Or are we witnessing today what will someday be 
remembered as the early decisions marking out a major re-
envisioning of Fourth Amendment doctrines for the twenty-first 
century?170  We may not yet be able to predict which assessment 
is the more accurate one, but the answer will come as the Court 
becomes forced to confront four key issues in its future decisions. 
 
169 See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Initial Reactions to Carpenter v. United States 4 
(Univ. of S. Cal. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 18-14, 
2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3209587; Orin S. Kerr, 
An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 
476, 479 (2011); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: 
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 802 (2004). 
170 Compare, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105–06 (1968) (decision 
recognizing taxpayer standing to raise Establishment Clause challenges, but which 
failed to mark long-term shift in doctrine), with Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479, 499 (1963) (decision widely regarded as origin of extensive and ongoing 
substantive due process right to privacy doctrine). 
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A. Expeditious Electronic Warrants and the Impracticability 
Rationale 
Several of the exceptions to the warrant requirement most 
frequently relevant in the context of criminal investigations by 
the police are based on a rationale of impracticability.  In 
recognizing these exceptions, the Court has concluded that a 
warrantless search is constitutionally permissible because the 
practical realities of these situations make it unfeasible or 
inappropriate to require the police to delay the search to obtain a 
warrant in advance, and instead, judicial review afterward is 
sufficient to protect Fourth Amendment interests.  While the 
decisions in McNeely and Birchfield ruled only as to the 
applicability of the exigent circumstances exception in the 
specific context of a BAC blood draw in a DUI investigation, the 
Court’s reasoning in those cases has potentially significant 
implications for all of the exceptions based on the 
impracticability rationale. 
Some situations of exigent circumstances, of course, will 
continue to present the problem of impracticability no matter 
how fast the electronic search warrant process becomes.  Hot 
pursuit of a fleeing, dangerous felony suspect, for example, 
should not be ceased even if a search warrant to enter a 
residence could be obtained in a matter of minutes, because even 
a brief delay creates risks such as the taking of hostages or a 
barricaded ambush or shootout.171  Likewise, a mentally unwell 
individual who is a danger to himself or others deserves 
immediate intervention, rather than risk the tragic harms that 
could occur while waiting even briefly for a warrant.172  On the 
other hand, McNeely and Birchfield correctly require that the 
determination of whether the destruction or loss of perishable 
evidence is “imminent” enough to overcome the warrant 
requirement depends not only on the nature of the evidence and 
the pace of its disappearance, but also on the likely length of any 
delay attendant to obtaining a warrant before securing the 
evidence.  While it is true that moderate quantities of narcotics 
can be flushed down the toilet quickly, it would take considerably 
longer to shred a large number of paper documents or erase an 
 
171 See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–300 (1967); United States v. 
Ibarra-Zelaya, 465 F.3d 596, 605–06 (5th Cir. 2006); Edward H. Arens, Note, Armed 
Standoffs and the Warrant Requirement, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1517, 1526–27 (2008). 
172 See Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 45, 48 (2009) (per curiam). 
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entire hard drive of digital files, which might very well be 
deemed more analogous to the rate of naturally metabolizing of 
BAC.  Thus, McNeely and Birchfield reemphasize the rejection of 
bright-line rules and the continuing importance of the 
longstanding totality of circumstances analysis in exigency 
cases.173 
Other important exceptions to the warrant requirement, 
however, traditionally have relied upon categorical rules of 
impracticability rather than a case-by-case approach.  Since its 
inception in the Prohibition era, the automobile exception has 
been grounded in the rationale that motor vehicles are readily 
mobile, and therefore evidence contained within them inherently 
carries the possibility that it will vanish before a search warrant 
can be obtained.174  The Court’s cases consistently have applied 
this categorical rule to all motor vehicle searches regardless of 
the particular facts, such as a roadside traffic stop fully under 
the control of the police after a controlled delivery of marijuana 
in California v. Acevedo, and even a car secured in the impound 
lot at a police station in Chambers v. Maroney.175  Likewise, the 
search incident to arrest exception’s categorical approach to the 
impracticability rationale has been applied not only to allow the 
police to find and secure physical items at the scene of the arrest, 
but also to permit subsequent laboratory testing of items 
recovered to determine their nature, such as the presence of 
heroin inside gelatin capsules found in a cigarette carton in 
United States v. Robinson or cocaine found in a bag in a jacket 
pocket in Arizona v. Gant.176 
The reasoning in McNeely and Birchfield emphasizing the 
increasingly expeditious availability of electronic warrants calls 
into question the continuing doctrinal soundness of maintaining 
a categorical impracticability approach for these exceptions.  The 
automobile exception is premised on the existence of probable 
cause anyway, so the issuance of search warrants for the subject 
vehicles should be expected to be routine and uneventful.  
 
173  Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2174 (2016); see Missouri v. 
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1559–60, 1559 n.3, 1563 (2013); id. at 1568–69 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring). 
174 See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569 (1991); California v. Carney, 471 
U.S. 386, 390 (1985) (emphasizing reduced expectation of privacy in motor vehicles 
compared to homes). 
175 See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 566–68; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 43–46 
(1970). 
176 See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
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Chambers seems particularly dubious now that warrants can be 
obtained so quickly; there is little meaningful possibility that 
evidence will disappear from a motor vehicle in a secured police 
facility in the time it would take to obtain an electronic warrant.  
Similarly, when the occupants of a car have been or will be 
arrested in a roadside stop, it is difficult to see why a short delay 
to obtain an electronic warrant would interfere with the recovery 
of the criminal evidence if the car will be towed from the scene 
and secured in any event.  Perhaps a roadside warrantless search 
would be suitable in some situations, such as when the officer 
intends to allow other occupants of the car to depart in the 
vehicle after seizing evidence against a single suspect—but such 
an assessment would be entirely consistent with abrogating the 
categorical approach and instead evaluating warrantless 
searches on a case-by-case basis. 
Likewise, a categorical authorization of some warrantless 
searching incident to arrest is appropriate to permit the police to 
protect against ambush and loss of destructible evidence—which 
inherently must occur at the moment of the arrest to serve the 
purpose of that immediate inspection.  On the other hand, when 
police have probable cause to believe that an item or substance 
discovered during a search incident to arrest is an illegal 
narcotic, a stolen good, or other criminal evidence requiring 
further confirmation beyond plain view, an electronic warrant 
easily could be obtained in the time between the arrest and the 
additional inquiry to confirm its nature.177  Rejecting a 
categorical approach for subsequent analysis of items seized 
during a search incident to arrest would preserve the authority of 
the police to search any arrestee’s property by obtaining a 
warrant when they have a valid basis to do so, while eliminating 
the ability of the police to conduct fishing expeditions in the 
personal effects of an arrestee in the hope of stumbling across 
 
177 The Court has held that even the simple act of slightly adjusting the position 
of electronic equipment to read and record the serial number, then confirming 
whether it had been reported stolen, could not be justified under the plain view 
doctrine and instead constituted a separate evidentiary “search” requiring probable 
cause and a warrant. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324–25, 326–27 (1987). 
Under current doctrine, however, subsequent analysis of items discovered during a 
search incident to arrest is not subject to this limitation because that exception, not 
plain view, governs the additional inspection. See supra note 98 and accompanying 
text. 
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criminal evidence, even unrelated to the crime of arrest.178  While 
it is true that the Court’s reasoning in Riley for requiring 
warrants to search a device’s digital data is based primarily on 
its assessment of the dramatically heightened risk of improper 
disclosure of private information compared to physical papers or 
effects found during an arrest, the Court’s ongoing cases about 
digital data could result in a reconsideration of the appropriate 
scope of warrantless searches of physical objects as well.179 
Finally, a similar concern exists under the plain view 
doctrine, including for searches carried out pursuant to a valid 
warrant.  When the police are lawfully present to observe 
evidence and have lawful access to seize that evidence, they may 
take custody of what they believe to be criminal evidence on the 
spot without first obtaining a warrant so long as the probable 
cause justifying that belief is “immediately apparent” without 
further investigation beyond the initial observation.180  Often, 
this doctrine applies when the police inadvertently encounter 
evidence of one crime while searching for evidence of another, but 
it is not limited to such situations.181  Accordingly, sometimes the 
police will seize a fairly large quantity of evidence without a 
warrant and seek to justify the seizure under the plain view 
doctrine—and the courts must determine whether police 
improperly expanded a valid initial search into a new, separate 
search for which a warrant should have been obtained.182  This 
 
178 For example, in Gant the Court abrogated the categorical approach 
previously governing searches of cars incident to arrest to instead require 
fact-specific justification for searching the car: either to protect the police because 
the scene was in fact unsecured or to locate and seize evidence of the crime of arrest 
which could be present in the vehicle. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343–44 
(2009); id. at 352–53 (Scalia, J., concurring). In Riley, however, the Court reaffirmed 
Robinson’s rationale that “unknown physical objects may always pose risks, no 
matter how slight, during the tense atmosphere of a custodial arrest;” accordingly, 
because “[t]he officer in Robinson testified that he could not identify the objects in 
the cigarette pack but knew they were not cigarettes,” then “a further search was a 
reasonable protective measure”—that is, the subsequent warrantless laboratory 
testing which confirmed the presence of heroin in the gelatin capsules found in the 
cigarette pack. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014). 
179 See Riley, 573 U.S. at 406–07 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting different 
treatment after Riley of physical papers and digital data carried on the person). 
180 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993); Arizona v. Hicks, 
480 U.S. 321, 334–35 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
181 See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 135 (1990). 
182 See, e.g., United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1271, 1276 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that discovery of over 200 image files of child pornography found while 
executing search warrant for narcotics offenses exceeded scope of warrant); United 
States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 530–31 (E.D. Va. 1999) (holding that discovery of 
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problem has become especially acute in searches of digital data, 
where an inspection pursuant to a search warrant related to one 
offense, such as financial or narcotics crimes, may lead to the 
discovery of substantial evidence of another crime in plain  
view—often child pornography, the nature of which frequently is 
immediately apparent.183  Although the Court has yet to consider 
a case presenting such facts, the emphasis in McNeely and 
Birchfield on the ready availability of electronic warrants 
suggests that police should be discouraged from acquiring 
extensive evidence under the plain view doctrine based on 
probable cause alone in situations where it would have been easy 
to obtain a search warrant to clearly validate the continuing 
discovery of additional evidence and its seizure. 
B. “Surveillance” in the Digital Age: Aggregation, Data-Mining, 
and Mosaic Theory 
Long before today’s sophisticated data-gathering and 
data-analysis technology came into being, the Court 
acknowledged that the ability of the Government to conduct 
omnipresent surveillance of anyone—or everyone—might require 
different treatment under the Fourth Amendment than 
traditional common law investigative techniques and their 
marginal improvement by simplistic technological enhancement.  
In Knotts, for example, the Court noted the defendant’s 
contention that “the result of the holding sought by the 
government would be that twenty-four hour surveillance of any 
citizen of this country will be possible, without judicial 
knowledge or supervision,” but rejected it because “the reality 
hardly suggests abuse . . . if such dragnet type law enforcement 
practices as [defendant] envisions should eventually occur, there 
 
images of child pornography found while executing warrant for computer hacking 
offenses, used to obtain second warrant to search computer for child pornography, 
was permissible under plain view doctrine). 
183 See Adam M. Gershowitz, The Post-Riley Search Warrant: Search Protocols 
and Particularity in Cell Phone Searches, 69 VAND. L. REV. 585, 598–99 (2016); Orin 
S. Kerr, Executing Warrants for Digital Evidence: The Case for Use Restrictions on 
Nonresponsive Data, 48 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2015); Orin S. Kerr, Searches and 
Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 569–70 (2005); see also, e.g., 
James T. Stinsman, Comment, Computer Seizures and Searches: Rethinking the 
Applicability of the Plain View Doctrine, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 1097, 1097–98 (2011); 
David J. S. Ziff, Note, Fourth Amendment Limitations on the Execution of Computer 
Searches Conducted Pursuant to A Warrant, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 841, 846 (2005). 
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will be time enough then to determine whether different 
constitutional principles may be applicable.”184 
That time undeniably has arrived.  The Riley Court rightly 
described the incredible amount of detail about a person, from 
mundane activities and interests to the most intimate aspects of 
private life, which can be gleaned from accessing and evaluating 
the multitude of text, images, and other data stored on 
smartphones or laptops or in the internet cloud accounts linked 
from such devices.185  But the information contained in and 
revealed by a person’s own tangible and electronic “papers” is 
only one component of the data about a person generated and 
retained in the digital age.  Just as the Court in Kyllo recognized 
that the use of sense-enhancing technology to make a 
constructive entry into a home must be subject to the warrant 
requirement in the same manner as physical entries, so too 
limiting the Fourth Amendment analysis merely to the 
Government’s direct intrusion into stored personal data, as 
occurred in Riley, would ignore the substantial dangers to 
privacy and liberty posed by many other forms of data-driven 
surveillance. 
Fortunately, the Court in Jones and Carpenter took 
important initial steps in subjecting police investigations relying 
upon data-driven surveillance to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.  
Although both cases involved data gathering about a defendant’s 
public movements and data analysis to connect the defendant’s 
location at certain times and places to the crimes charged, as well 
as a holding that the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights had 
been violated by the failure to obtain a search warrant before 
performing such extensive surveillance,186 the underlying 
rationale for the decisions is not limited to a person’s location 
information.  Without adopting a particular doctrinal definition 
like the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test or the Jones 
trespass test, the Court explained the key factors justifying 
judicial oversight of newly developing modes of sophisticated 
data-driven surveillance in light of the significant differences 
from the investigative methods and outcomes traditionally 
available at common law. 
 
184 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283–84 (1983) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). 
185 See Riley, 573 U.S. at 393–97. 
186 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018); Jones v. United 
States, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012). 
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First, data-driven surveillance allows the Government to 
gather vastly greater quantities of information about a person 
than has ever been possible before.  As the concurring opinion in 
Jones noted, constant month-long surveillance of a suspect’s 
public movements by police officers would be cost-prohibitive in 
both financial and personnel resources, except perhaps in 
investigations of extraordinary importance.187  The amount of 
data acquired in Carpenter was even larger.188  Prior to 
automated technological tracking and recordkeeping like GPS 
monitoring or historical CSLI archives, this sheer quantity of 
data gathering was literally unattainable in routine 
investigations such as those of the local drug dealer in Jones or 
the half-dozen store robberies in Carpenter.189  With the rapidly 
changing scope of advancing technology in mind, the Court 
declined to quantify a specific numerical boundary on the amount 
of data-gathering that is permissible prior to advance judicial 
review.  The Carpenter majority concluded that the week’s worth 
of CSLI data obtained from Sprint constituted a “search” 
requiring a warrant supported by probable cause.190  The Jones 
concurring opinion offered another perspective: when police are 
unsure about the extent of their authority, they should err on the 
side of obtaining a warrant.191 
Second, data-driven surveillance also provides the 
Government with information of a very different qualitative 
nature than has ever existed previously.  The real-time GPS 
tracker in Jones offered the investigators a zero percent error 
rate and offered the jury a portrait of the defendant’s movements 
free from doubts about human perception, memory, and 
credibility.192  The CSLI data in Carpenter had those same 
 
187 See 565 U.S. at 429–30 (Alito, J., concurring). 
188 See 138 S. Ct. at 2212. 
189 Jones owned and operated a nightclub in Washington, D.C. while involved in 
a conspiracy to distribute cocaine and cocaine base. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 402–03. 
Carpenter was the leader of a conspiracy charged with the robbery of six stores. See 
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212. By contrast, in the familiar case of Costello v. United 
States, the defendant’s trial on tax evasion charges for three tax years involved the 
prosecution’s presentation of 144 witnesses and 368 exhibits to prove the extent of 
the defendant’s unreported income. 350 U.S. 359, 360 (1956); see also id. at 363 
(rejecting defendant’s constitutional challenge to grand jury’s indictment based on 
hearsay testimony of three IRS agents summarizing evidence later produced in full 
at trial). 
190 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 n.3. 
191 See Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring). 
192 See id.; see also id. at 415–16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
128 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:89   
advantages plus the added benefit of allowing the police to 
retroactively reconstruct the defendant’s movements long after 
they had occurred, when the weaknesses in memory and 
credibility would have been far larger hurdles for police or 
prosecutors to overcome.193  Again the Court declined to offer any 
particular definition of the qualitative nature of technologically 
assisted data-driven surveillance that is permissible without a 
search warrant.  Rather, the ambiguity in this aspect of the 
Court’s doctrinal line between police investigative activity on 
their own initiative and “searches” governed by the Fourth 
Amendment serves to reinvigorate the longstanding basis for the 
warrant requirement from Johnson: to create significant 
incentives for the police to proceed with judicial review in 
advance as much as possible when an indeterminate scope of 
privacy or liberty interests is at stake.194 
The Court’s decisions in Jones and Carpenter become even 
more significant when taking into account the potential extent of 
today’s data-driven surveillance to reach far beyond the 
relatively simplistic use of such techniques in those cases.  It is 
one thing for the police to generate or acquire a database of 
location points and undertake data-mining to retrieve certain 
particular dates and times of great utility in a particular criminal 
prosecution.  It is something else entirely for the police to 
aggregate multiple sources of data, perhaps even combining 
several expansive databases in doing so, and then mine this 
aggregation to learn information that could not have been 
determined from any dataset individually—thereby creating 
information that literally did not exist anywhere in the world 
until the police investigation brought it into existence.  While it 
is true that grand juries, administrative agencies, and legislative 
bodies possess subpoena power capable of conducting extensive 
investigations and amassing substantial amounts of information, 
those institutions have different forms of accountability and 
oversight compared to ordinary police activity.195  The Court’s 
 
193 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218. 
194 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
195 The dissenting justices in Carpenter argued that the court orders issued to 
the cellular providers to disclose their historical CSLI records pursuant to the 
provisions of the Stored Communications Act were functionally equivalent to 
subpoenas and therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Carpenter, 138 
S. Ct. at 2228–29 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 2247–57 (Alito, J., dissenting); see 
also id. at 2244 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The majority opinion rejected this analogy 
on the facts, maintaining that “this Court has never held that the Government may 
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implicit acceptance of the “mosaic theory” of the Fourth 
Amendment thus recognizes that a police investigation which 
gathers and analyzes data in a manner that provides a 
comprehensive picture of a person’s life is a form of state action 
worthy of stringent judicial oversight.196 
Although the specific factual context is different, the Court’s 
analysis is consistent with the conclusion that police 
investigative methods and outcomes achieved by data-driven 
surveillance can be viewed as functionally equivalent to the 
general warrants despised by the Framers.197  When the police 
can investigate anyone, anywhere, at any time in pursuit of 
solving crimes, no one is secure in their persons, property, or 
liberty.198  General warrants issued to law enforcement officers 
 
subpoena third parties for records in which the suspect has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy.” Id. at 2221 (majority opinion); see also id. at 2222 (addressing Alito’s 
dissent). But see id. at 2255 (Alito, J., dissenting) (addressing the majority opinion’s 
statement). Traditional subpoenas are distinguishable on other grounds as well. See 
generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 8.7 (2018). Unlike 
ordinary police investigations, legislators are directly politically accountable to their 
constituents; administrative agencies are constrained to the specific range of subject 
matters within their delegation of executive authority, and most administrative 
subpoenas are issued pursuant to civil rather than criminal enforcement actions. 
Likewise, the ordinary citizens serving as jurors function as a check on prosecutorial 
overreach during a grand jury investigation of criminal activity, and, unlike a search 
warrant, the recipient of a grand jury subpoena has the opportunity to challenge the 
validity or scope of the subpoena before a judge prior to appearing before the grand 
jury. See id. § 8.4(b). The court orders issued pursuant to the SCA, by contrast, are 
compulsory process issued in the same manner as a warrant—an ex parte 
proceeding involving only the Government and the judge—but without the 
requirements of probable cause and particularity required for search warrants. See 
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221–22; see also Historical Scholars Brief, supra note 142, 
at 29. While the company receiving the SCA order may object prior to compliance if 
its scope is excessively broad or burdensome, the party whose data is being obtained 
has no notice or opportunity to be heard as to the validity or scope of the request. See 
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221; id. at 2255 (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing 18 
U.S.C.A § 2703(d) (West 2014)). Thus, the majority in Carpenter declined to apply 
the Fourth Amendment analysis applicable to traditional subpoenas, including from 
grand juries, to SCA court orders issued to facilitate ordinary police investigations. 
196 See Priester, supra note 18, at 522–24; see also, e.g., Emily Berman, When 
Database Queries Are Fourth Amendment Searches, 102 MINN. L. REV. 577, 578 
(2017); David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. 
L. REV. 62, 67 (2013); Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 
111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 314 (2012); Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, 
Actual Expectations of Privacy, Fourth Amendment Doctrine, and the Mosaic Theory, 
2015 SUP. CT. REV. 205, 209 (2015). 
197 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213. 
198 See id. at 2217–20; see also Historical Scholars Brief, supra note 142, at  
14–28; Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment as a Collective Right, 43 TEX. 
TECH L. REV. 255, 264 (2010). 
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represent a paradigm case that the Fourth Amendment sought to 
address, and the Court rightly applies its protections not merely 
to the exact facts contemplated by the Framers but also to 
contemporary scenarios presenting the same kind and degree of 
threats of governmental abuse of power.199 
C. The Third-Party Doctrine and Business Records 
Concerns about the Government’s ability to use vast 
quantities of digital data to compile a chillingly gigantic portfolio 
of data on a criminal suspect—or, worse, on every American—are 
exacerbated by orders of magnitude when the Government can 
acquire and analyze data not only from its own surveillance 
activities but also from the seemingly endless array of ordinary 
business records generated every second of every day in the 
interconnected age.  Cellphone locations in real time and 
archived for years, internet traffic from deliberate browsing and 
apps running in the background, electronic financial transactions 
with no tangible paper trail, and a multitude of other mundane 
tasks in everyday affairs would provide a comprehensive portrait 
of an individual’s entire life if they could be easily aggregated 
and data-mined.  Under the extant third-party doctrine, however, 
the acquisition of business records by the police is not a “search” 
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore no factual 
basis in articulable individual suspicion, much less a warrant, is 
required to obtain them—regardless of the amount of information 
acquired or the scope of the intimate details of a person’s life 
thereby revealed. 
The third-party doctrine’s rejection of Fourth Amendment 
challenges to police investigations of business records originates 
in United States v. Miller, a 1976 decision regarding bank 
records, and Smith v. Maryland, a 1979 decision involving a 
record of phone numbers dialed to connect calls through a 
company’s network.200  The Court transposed the analysis 
applicable to undercover agents, confidential informants, and 
flipped cooperating criminals—that an individual cannot claim 
 
199 See JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
SELF-GOVERNMENT 178–95 (2001) (arguing for a “paradigm case interpretation” of 
the Constitution). 
200 See generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v. 
Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). See also Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21,  
52–54 (1974) (rejecting Fourth Amendment challenge to subpoena provisions of 
Bank Secrecy Act of 1970). 
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that a reasonable expectation of privacy was breached when a 
“false friend” betrays their confidences to the police201—to 
conclude that a person equally “assumes the risk” that a business 
will provide evidence of transactions or interactions in its records 
to the police.202  In Miller, federal agents reviewed four months of 
account statements and microfilm archives of cleared checks, 
ultimately using a small number of those documents at the 
defendant’s trial to establish purchases and a vehicle rental as 
overt acts in furtherance of a conspiracy.203  In Smith, 
anticipating that a robbery suspect would continue his pattern of 
phone calls taunting a previous victim, the police had the phone 
company install a pen register at its office to record the phone 
numbers dialed from the suspect’s home phone—and the suspect 
made another call to the victim’s home that very same day.204  
Along with considerable evidence obtained from the suspect’s 
home pursuant to a subsequent search warrant, the record from 
the pen register was introduced at his trial.205  Thus, in both 
cases the scope of the business records obtained by the police was 
small, and the amount of them used at trial even smaller. 
The Court’s reasoning in these decisions has been dubious 
from its inception,206 but the consequences of a reflexive 
application of the doctrine to massive quantities of digital 
business records have led to numerous calls to revisit or abrogate 
the doctrine.207  Several important points are worth noting.  For 
 
201 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745,  
751–52 (1971)); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v. United 
States, 373 U.S. 427, 440 (1963)). 
202 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742–45, 747; Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. 
203 Miller, 425 U.S. at 437–38. The bank received a grand jury subpoena, but 
law enforcement agents reviewed the documents on site at the bank so that bank 
officers would not have to appear before the grand jury. See id. 
204 Smith, 442 U.S. at 737; see also State v. Smith, 389 A.2d 858, 859–60 (Md. 
1978). 
205 Smith, 442 U.S. at 737–38. 
206 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 747 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 748–50 (Marshall, 
J., dissenting); Miller, 425 U.S. at 455–56 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., 
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2262–63, 2272 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting); David A. Harris, Riley v. California and the Beginning of the End for the 
Third-Party Search Doctrine, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 895, 897–98 (2016); Priester, 
supra note 18, at 525–26, 525 n.190 (citing representative scholarship). 
207 See Priester, supra note 18, at 523–29; see also Brief for Petitioner at 35–53, 
65–76, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16-402); Brief of 
Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. in Support of Petitioner at 24–29, 
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (No. 16-402) [hereinafter EFF Brief]; Brief of Amici 
Curiae Empirical Fourth Amendment Scholars in Support of Petitioner at 2–14, 
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (No. 16-402); Brief of Scholars of Criminal Procedure and 
132 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:89   
one, it is far easier for the police to access and review—or to 
make duplicate copies of—archived electronic business records 
compared to the paper files that existed at common law, or even 
Miller’s microfilm.  Digital data can be indexed, word-searched, 
and cross-referenced by software—a far cry from the slow and 
labor-intensive process of manually viewing documents to 
identify pertinent information or to synthesize relevant data 
across multiple records. 
In addition, the rapid expansion of memory capacity in 
digital devices, much less the effectively infinite storage available 
in the internet’s cloud, has dramatically reduced the practical 
limitations that previously constrained the quantity and duration 
of the retention of a company’s records in the ordinary course of 
business.  Gone are the days of costly expenses to maintain 
records archives, including renting warehouse space to store 
banker’s boxes of old records, destroying them after time has 
elapsed to make room for newer files, and paying an employee or 
outside vendor to monitor and implement such a document 
retention policy.  It is literally inconceivable that cellphone 
service carriers would retain years’ worth of historical CSLI 
records—relating to all of their hundreds of thousands of 
antennae and many billions of data points of activity passing 
through those towers from all cellphones, including their own 
millions of customers as well as users accessing the network via 
roaming agreements with other carriers—if those records had to 
be kept on paper rather than as digital data stored on servers.208 
And if businesses are retaining many more documents for a 
much longer period of time, then the police will be able to obtain 
access to information that previously would have disappeared 
long before they sought it.  Just as the use of digital location data 
has enabled the police to construct a mosaic of a person’s public 
movements that would have been entirely impossible even a few 
 
Privacy as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 14–30, Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 
2206 (No. 16-402); Brief for Technology Cos. as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither 
Party at 23–25, 28–33, Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (No. 16-402). 
208 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211–12 (“There are 396 million cell phone 
service accounts in the United States—for a Nation of 326 million people.”); see also 
EFF Brief, supra note 207, at 5–10 (providing information regarding number of cell 
phones, number of cell sites and antennae, and quantity of data transferred over 
cellular networks over time, emphasizing dramatic growth in each, especially after 
2010); Brief of Technology Experts as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at  
14–27, Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (No. 16-402); Brief for Technology Cos., supra note 
207, at 12–23. 
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decades ago, so too the nature and longevity of digital business 
records has eliminated the practical constraints which would 
have made impossible the kind of data collection and analysis 
that can be done quickly and cheaply today.209 
Fortunately, the Court is aware of these concerns.  
Concurring in Jones, Justice Sotomayor urged the Court to 
reconsider the doctrine in an appropriate case.210  Although the 
question was briefed and argued in Carpenter,211 the majority 
declined to expressly overrule the entire third-party doctrine or 
revisit in detail its underlying conceptual basis, instead 
distinguishing the historical CSLI records on the facts.212  Days 
after Carpenter was handed down, the Court denied certiorari to 
a petition challenging the third-party doctrine as applied to the 
Government’s acquisition of internet protocol traffic data from an 
internet service provider’s network while investigating a 
notorious internet drug trafficking kingpin known as “Dread 
Pirate Roberts,” a reference to The Princess Bride rather than the 
Chief Justice.213  The prospects for the ongoing retention of the 
third-party doctrine might have appeared stronger if the 
Government had prevailed in Carpenter, but the ramifications of 
the Court’s holding in favor of the defendant reach well beyond 
historical CSLI records—and the Court’s review of additional 
cases involving digital business records is seemingly inevitable. 
 
209 Although Justice Alito recognized the implication of the Government 
technologically bypassing traditional limitations in Jones, he did not reach the same 
conclusion in Carpenter for third-party business records. See 138 S. Ct. at 2259–60 
(Alito, J., dissenting); Jones v. United States, 565 U.S. 400, 429–31 (2012) (Alito, J., 
concurring). 
210 See 565 U.S. at 417–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
211 See supra note 207; Transcript of Oral Argument at 4–6, 15–17, 22–27,  
41–42, 50–51, 67–70, Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (No. 16-402). 
212 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217, 2219–20; see also id. at 2227, 2230,  
2232–33 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (rejecting majority’s arguments on third party 
doctrine); Kerr, supra note 169, at 12. 
213 See Ulbricht v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2708, 2708 (2018) (denying petition 
for certiorari); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 11–22, Ulbricht, 138 S. Ct. 2708 
(No. 17-950). Unlike the existing historical business records sought in Carpenter and 
similar to the pen register for telephone dialing information in Smith, the agents 
investigating Dread Pirate Roberts and Silk Road conducted real-time monitoring of 
the defendant’s internet traffic under a “pen/trap order” issued pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3122. See United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 83–84, 94–98 (2d Cir. 
2017). “The name alludes to the pseudonym of a pirate in the popular novel and film 
The Princess Bride that is periodically passed on from one individual to another.” Id. 
at 87 n.12 (citing WILLIAM GOLDMAN, THE PRINCESS BRIDE: S. MORGENSTERN’S 
CLASSIC TALE OF TRUE LOVE AND HIGH ADVENTURE (1973); THE PRINCESS BRIDE 
(20th Century Fox 1987)). 
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D. Data is Different 
In the Court’s constitutional law applicable to criminal 
sentencing, the aphorism “death is different” reflects the 
longstanding conflict among the justices over the appropriateness 
of imposing heightened procedural requirements and additional 
substantive limitations in capital cases through interpretation of 
the Eighth Amendment.214  An even more controversial part of 
that doctrine is the reliance on “evolving standards of decency” to 
render unconstitutional some capital sentencing practices 
previously permitted by the Court’s precedent.215 
The reality that data is different poses a similar interpretive 
challenge for the Court under the Fourth Amendment.  This is 
especially true because differences between data gathering and 
data analysis on the one hand, and traditional modes and 
outcomes of police investigations on the other, will only continue 
to become greater over time—with the pace of change and 
corresponding divergence proceeding more quickly than ever 
before.  Kyllo and Jardines are important decisions in ensuring 
that the march of technology does not strip away the traditional 
privacy and security of the home, but they involved specific 
investigative acts on a particular occasion to make a discrete 
factual finding about the contents of a home at that precise 
moment.  Jones, Riley, and Carpenter raise the prospect of much 
broader, and much more disturbing, police investigations into 
extensive details of individuals’ lives and activities over 
expansive periods of time.  It is no surprise, therefore, that the 
Court has treaded cautiously in both its holdings and its 
reasoning during its initial forays into the future of the Fourth 
Amendment.216 
The difficulty of this challenge is apparent from the wide 
range of perspectives among the justices of the Roberts Court 
about how to approach the Fourth Amendment analysis in data-
 
214 See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 84 (2008) (Alito, J., concurring); Murray 
v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 21 n.9 (1989) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 
411 (1986)). 
215 See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 469–70 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 
560 U.S. 48, 58 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560–61 (2005). And of 
course, criminal procedure is far from the only area of constitutional law where the 
Court faces the problem of applying doctrine to changing circumstances or new 
technology. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2090–91 (2018) 
(taxation of internet commerce). 
216 See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM 
ON THE SUPREME COURT 3 (1999). 
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investigation cases.  The textual enumeration of protecting 
“persons, houses, papers, and effects” from “searches” that are 
“unreasonable” provides at least the minimum scope of Fourth 
Amendment rights, but the justices do not agree about how much 
further the constitutional protection should extend.217  Likewise, 
the original understanding of the Amendment’s meaning may be 
fairly analogous in some contexts but analytically unhelpful in 
others.218  Even the Court’s own precedent from the pre-digital 
era may be proving unworkable, with criticisms ranging from 
eliminating the third-party doctrine to the suggestion that the 
Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test should be abrogated 
in favor of limiting the scope of the doctrine to the enumerated 
interests.219 
Yet, the Roberts Court also recognizes the unavoidable need 
for the law to keep pace with changing technology, as well as 
society’s changing perceptions of that technology.  Ideally, much 
of the initial response to technological and social change should 
come from the legislature; Congress previously acted to address 
wiretaps and pen registers, foreign intelligence surveillance 
during the Cold War, and internet computer fraud.220  State 
 
217 Compare, e.g., Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213–19 (applying the Katz 
reasonable expectation of privacy test and corresponding case precedent to 
determine scope of Fourth Amendment protections), with id. at 2238–43 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (rejecting application of the Katz privacy-based doctrine in favor of 
limiting Fourth Amendment protections to enumerated interests). 
218 Compare, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2013) (analogizing 
common law bloodhounds and contemporary narcotics-sniffing dogs), with Jones v. 
United States, 565 U.S. 400, 429–31, 429 n.10 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (rejecting 
analogy of common law location surveillance to technological GPS tracking). 
219 See, e.g., Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2236 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (questioning 
Katz test); id. at 2264 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (questioning Katz test); Jones, 565 
U.S. at 415–16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (questioning third party doctrine). 
220 See, e.g., Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1030(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 2190 (1984) (codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 1030 (2012)) (Computer Fraud & Abuse Act, first enacted in Comprehensive 
Crime Control Act of 1984 and subsequently expanded by amendment in 1986, 1992, 
1996, 2001, and 2008); Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. 
No. 90-351, tit. III, 82 Stat. 197, 211 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A §§ 2510–22 (West 
2014)) (“Title III” of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 
governing wiretapping and electronic surveillance, enacted in response to Berger v. 
New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)); 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 3121-126, 100 
Stat. 1848, 1868 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3121–27 (West 2014)) (“Pen/Trap 
Statute” applicable to pen register and trap-and-trace surveillance, enacted in 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 105(a), 92 Stat. 1783, 1790 (1978) (codified at 50 
U.S.C.A. §§ 1801–62 (West 2014)) (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978). 
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legislatures have enacted important protections for data privacy 
as well, implicating how both law enforcement and corporations 
make use of “Big Data” gathering and analysis.221  In May 2018, 
many U.S. consumers received numerous emails or other notices 
regarding updates to the data-privacy policies of companies doing 
business in the European Union due to implementation of the 
General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”).222  Although 
public policy solutions enacted in statutes may not always be 
constitutionally sufficient, as with the already-anachronistic 
provisions of the Stored Communications Act at issue in 
Carpenter,223 it is far easier for the Court to review the terms of a 
comprehensive solution enacted by the legislature than to 
attempt to govern the field itself through constitutional 
interpretation. 
 
Justice Alito has expressly urged legislative action to address Fourth Amendment 
concerns related to technological advancements. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2261 
(Alito, J., dissenting); Jones, 565 U.S. at 429–30 (Alito, J., concurring). 
221 See, e.g., Melody Gutierrez, Gov. Jerry Brown Signs Far-Reaching California 
Internet Privacy Bill, S.F. CHRON. (June 28, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/ 
politics/article/California-lawmakers-approve-internet-privacy-13034880.php 
(“Under AB375, web users can demand that a business tell them what personal 
information it is collecting about them, whether it is selling or sharing it, and who is 
ending up with it. Consumers can also tell a company to delete their personal 
information.”). An excellent discussion of the dangers of “Big Data” is found in 
FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY 19–58 (2015). Privacy is just one area in 
which legislation to address new technologies is necessary. See, e.g., Taly 
Matiteyahu, Drone Regulations and Fourth Amendment Rights: The Interaction of 
State Drone Statutes and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 48 COLUM. J.L. & 
SOC. PROBS. 265, 267–68 (2015). 
222 See, e.g., Kathleen Paisley, It’s All About the Data: The Impact of the EU 
General Data Protection Regulation on International Arbitration, 41 FORDHAM INT’L 
L.J. 841, 846 (2018); Brian Fung, Why You’re Getting Flooded with Privacy 
Notifications in Your Email; Everyone from Airbnb to Yelp is Suddenly Updating 
Their Terms of Service, WASH. POST (May 25, 2018), https://www.washington 
post.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/05/25/why-youre-getting-flooded-with-privacy-
notifications-in-your-email/?utm_term=.d47d931bdcf4; Nikhil Kalyanpur & 
Abraham Newman, Today, a New E.U. Law Transforms Privacy Rights for 
Everyone. Without Edward Snowden, It Might Never Have Happened., WASH. POST 
(May 25, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/05/25/ 
today-a-new-eu-law-transforms-privacy-rights-for-everyone-without-edward-
snowden-it-might-never-have-happened/?utm_term=.f566eafc755d. 
223 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 207, at 49–50 (noting that 1986 
enactment of and 1994 amendments to SCA “neither intended to address nor even 
considered CSLI, much less whether obtaining longer-term CSLI should require a 
warrant” and emphasizing that “Congress simply did not anticipate the 
contemporary ubiquity of cell phones and the volume and precision of CSLI that 
would be retained by service providers”). 
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At the same time, these changes in legislation and social 
norms also may affect how the Court assesses the meaning of the 
Constitution.224  In many of today’s data-privacy policies, a 
company will use the term “your data” to refer to the information 
that is acquired, retained, transferred, or deleted under the 
provisions of the policy.  The typical meaning of that term has 
been “data that we possess about you” pursuant to Terms of 
Service or related adhesion contracts.  In view of 
consumer-favorable changes required by the GDPR and similar 
laws, however, the meaning may be shifting toward “data about 
you in our records over which you have some legally enforceable 
rights.”  And it would not mark much of a shift for the meaning 
to become “information about you that you have a right to control 
and we happen to possess.” 
Thus, the phrase “your data” is one answer to the question 
“whose data?”—and possession or custody of digital information 
is only one aspect of the answer, just as multiple forms of legal 
interests in tangible and real property can exist 
simultaneously.225  Byrd’s functional rather than formalistic 
evaluation of the scope of Fourth Amendment rights for a 
contractually unauthorized driver of a rental car is only the most 
recent example of the Court rejecting a legalistic or 
hyper-technical interpretation of the people’s protection for 
“their” tangible papers or effects.226  In Carpenter, Justice 
Gorsuch suggested that the same principle may apply to digital 
data and business records—so that information about you could 
be yours in a constitutional sense even though you did not create 
or store it yourself.227  Though no other justice joined his opinion 
in that case, the notion already is present in the Court’s mind. 
 
224 See, e.g., William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the 
Fourth Amendment, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1828 (2016); Nicholas A. Kahn-Fogel, 
The Benefits of Using Investigative Legislation to Interpret the Fourth Amendment: A 
Response to Orin Kerr, 9 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 379, 380–81 (2018); Orin S. Kerr, 
The Effect of Legislation on Fourth Amendment Protection, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1117, 
1119–20 (2017); Richard M. Re, The Positive Law Floor, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 313, 
314 (2016). 
225 See, e.g., Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2268–70 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) 
(discussing bailments, constructive bailments, and postal mail as potential analogies 
for records or data held by third parties). 
226 See supra notes 113–117 (discussing Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518 
(2018)). 
227 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2269, 2270 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Just because 
you entrust your data—in some cases, your modern-day papers and effects—to a 
third party may not mean you lose any Fourth Amendment interest in its 
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CONCLUSION 
Like the often-misquoted quip by Mark Twain, the 
conventional wisdom’s assessment of the warrant requirement’s 
demise is exaggerated.228  So too is the conventional wisdom that 
conservative judges favor the police in Fourth Amendment 
cases—the various opinions of the justices show it to be a rather 
inaccurate predictor of doctrinal positions on the Roberts Court.  
Though he dissented in Jardines and McNeely, Chief Justice 
Roberts wrote the majority opinions in Riley and Carpenter.229  
Justice Alito dissented in Collins as well as Jardines and 
McNeely, but wrote Birchfield and concurred in the defendant’s 
favor in Jones and Riley.230  Justice Thomas has openly 
questioned the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test and 
dissented in McNeely and Birchfield, but he also joined all three 
of Justice Scalia’s majority opinions in Kyllo, Jones, and 
Jardines.231  When the majority in Maryland v. King authorized 
the use of DNA samples collected from dangerous felony 
arrestees not only for purposes of identification but also for 
comparison against archived DNA profiles from unrelated 
unsolved crimes, Justice Scalia wrote the strident dissent 
insisting that the warrant requirement should apply.232  And 
 
contents . . . . [T]he fact that we store data with third parties may amount to a sort 
of involuntary bailment too.”).  
228 In 1897, rumors of Twain’s death led him to write to a newspaper reporter, 
“[T]he report of my death was an exaggeration.” SHELLEY FISHER FISHKIN, 
LIGHTING OUT FOR THE TERRITORY: REFLECTIONS ON MARK TWAIN AND AMERICAN 
CULTURE 134 (1996). Twain died in 1910. 
229 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211; Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 377 
(2014); Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 166 (2013); Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 
1, 16 (2013). 
230 See Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1680 (2018); Birchfield v. North 
Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2166 (2016); Riley, 573 U.S. at 403; McNeely, 569 U.S. at 
166; Jardines, 569 U.S. at 16; Jones v. United States, 565 U.S. 400, 418 (2012). In 
Carpenter, Justice Alito also expressed concern that “some of the greatest threats to 
individual privacy may come from powerful private companies that collect and 
sometimes misuse vast quantities of data about the lives of ordinary Americans” as 
well as from governmental data gathering and analysis, and opined that legislation 
is the preferable means to address both of these threats. 138 S. Ct. at 2261 (Alito, J., 
dissenting). 
231 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2236–41, 2244–46 (Thomas, J., dissenting); 
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2197 (Thomas, J., dissenting); McNeely, 569 U.S. at 176 
(Thomas, J., dissenting); Jardines, 569 U.S. at 2; Jones, 565 U.S. at 401; Kyllo v. 
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001). 
232 See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 482 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“Perhaps the construction of such a genetic panopticon is wise. But I doubt that the 
proud men who wrote the charter of our liberties would have been so eager to open 
their mouths for royal inspection.”). Justice Breyer joined Justice Kennedy’s 
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Justice Gorsuch’s separate opinion in Carpenter potentially 
suggests an even more rigorous degree of Fourth Amendment 
protection for digital data than the majority opinion.233 
The Roberts Court’s recent Fourth Amendment decisions 
have resulted in a resurgence of the warrant requirement in a 
number of contexts, including physical inspections of persons, 
papers, and effects as well as location tracking of public 
movements by means of data-driven electronic surveillance.  
Furthermore, the reasoning in these decisions strongly suggests 
that the Court’s holdings will not remain limited to the specific 
factual situations of those cases.  Though the future development 
of the doctrine remains to be seen, the recent decisions viewed as 
a whole demonstrate that the Court and its justices take 
seriously the necessity of adapting Fourth Amendment doctrine 
to the new threats to privacy and liberty posed by police use of 
advanced technology and data analytics in the digital age. 
 
 
majority opinion, also joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and 
Alito; Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined Justice Scalia’s dissent. See 
id. at 438. 
233 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2267–72 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Despite this 
view, Justice Gorsuch dissented because he concluded the defendant had not 
properly preserved the argument, instead relying only on Katz doctrine. See id. at 
2272. 
